The Mimetic Competition of Victims

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Abstract

This article provides a critical sociological analysis of contemporary transnational memory politics in Europe. It explores the historical development through which the post-Cold War debate on Europe’s constitutive historical legacies took the form of mimetic competition of victims and thus failed to provide a possible common ground of political community. Instead of “drawing lessons of the past”, the culturally similar and competing memories of the Holocaust and of Communism have acquired mythical relevance, impeding political discourse proper.
In post-1989 European public debates, as has often been stated in the literature, the memory of “Gulag” competes with the memory of “Auschwitz” (Droit 2007) for equal recognition. Power relations in the transnational political field tend to be objectified in the binary logic of these competing memory claims as the debate over the boundaries of the European political community turns into a controversy over the historical legacies of the past. The question of communism is raised in this setting as a memory issue to be integrated into a common historical narrative of the Holocaust, one capable of providing solidarity in the political community. Furthermore, it is not Nazism or communism themselves that are debated in the framework of a possible European memory (Pakier-Strath 2010), but their asymmetric relation. The transnational field of positions in which this relation is contested has two characteristics.

The first is the power relation constituted by the uniqueness claim of the Holocaust. The European debate on its constituent historical legacies showed the same dynamic as earlier memory competitions in history. Analyzing the relation generated by public claims of racial and political deportees of the Holocaust, Jean-Michel Chaumont (1997) termed this social dynamic the “competition of victims”, a “perverse effect of the uniqueness claim”. However, it is not restricted to the victims of Nazism. Peter Novick criticized (1999) the competition over “who suffered most” among social groups constructed by different memories of past victimization. The position taken by the uniqueness claim of the Holocaust is challenged in the name of other historical experiences of suffering claiming equal recognition. Two opposing sides emerge: from one side, the relativization of the Holocaust, even the falsification of history is objected to; from the other, the monopolization of suffering and the denial of recognition. In social struggles over the past, as Tzvetan Todorov argued (1995, 2000), the claim of uniqueness, even the incomparability and incomprehensibility of the Holocaust sacralizes memory and thus impedes historical understanding. As a result of the competition of victims, memory discourse becomes increasingly mythological and moralizing, reducing historical complexity to the black-and-white lessons of the past. As Charles Maier remarked apropos the Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington DC, “The lesson cannot be just that genocide is evil. This conclusion hardly requires the museum effort” (Maier 1993: 144). He points out that the lessons of the Holocaust justifying the existence of the museum (commemorating the Jewish tragedy in order to prevent it occurring again) have little to do with history which of course does not really repeat itself. Today, when the social imperative of the “duty to remember” has acquired international, if not universal significance,
the question is where the legitimacy of that public claim comes from. Early critiques of memory competition drew attention to how claims of victimization contribute to the social constitution of groups that presuppose social exclusion. The political struggle of vying victimized groups aims to acquire “equal recognition” of their suffering with that of the Jews. In spite of commemorative gestures of reconciliation, however, political conflicts over the past tend not to calm down. In this game public recognition concerns not the person but the status of the former victim. And status has to do with prestige whose equal distribution in power relations is hardly imaginable. The public acknowledgement of the victims’ status plays the role of qualification in the competition.

Despite their exclusive relation, competing memories are more similar to each other than one would expect on the basis of their rivalry. Research on the history of memory has shown that “the Holocaust has enabled the articulation of other histories of victimization at the same time that it has been declared ‘unique’ among human-perpetrated horrors” (Rothberg 2009: 6.). Concerning the memory of communism, “if there are common points with the memory of the Holocaust, it mainly concerns the modalities used to promote a process of remembering: the collecting of oral testimonies, the will to qualify the crimes with jurisdictional definitions like that of genocide, the creation of associations composed of former victims and representatives of the following generations, like Memorial, the claim for official recognition etc.” (Rousso 2011: 237). In order to explain the “rhetorical and cultural intimacy of seemingly opposed traditions of remembrance” (Rothberg 2009: 7), one has to step beyond the paradigm of exclusive competition and focus on how “competitors” influence each other. From a sociological perspective, the “competition” is a relational space in which positions are taken by memory-claims of actors whose interaction is manifested in struggles over competing memories of the past.

Instead of conceiving the space of competition as the neutral space of the market, characterized by the strategic choices of actors on the basis of the demand of “historicization” and the supply of “reactivated memories” (Mink Neumayer-Bonnard 2007, Mink-Neumayer 2013), I will theorize it as a social space in which agents struggle over the legitimate vision and division of the world (Bourdieu 1985). This approach puts emphasis on the unequal power relations constituting the field of positions, in which the “competitors” strive to break the “rules of play” while sharing the social illusion about the stakes of the game (Bourdieu 1980). By focusing on these rules, the following study aims to explain why post-communist EU member-states strive to incorporate especially “the experience of Soviet totalitarianism
into the foundation of European historical legitimacy”; and how this version of the past has become legitimized in opposition to old EU member-states’ “normative reconciliation principle” around the singularity of the Holocaust (Mink 2011: 262). Indeed, the relative success of the initiative to canonize communism as a constitutive element of European memory is largely due to the efficient mobilization and agenda-setting of post-communist “memory entrepreneurs” in their “quest for ‘memory adjustment’” (Neumayer, 2015: 2). An additional and necessary element of this success is that ultimately this initiative could not be broken on legitimate grounds. By analyzing the principles of legitimacy of historical experience in the social space of European memory politics, the following study aims to reconstruct “the historical labor of which the divisions and the social vision of these divisions are the product” (Bourdieu, 1985: 739). The historical sociological explanation of the binary and antagonistic structure of transnational European memory political space accounts for the changing conditions of legitimately claiming historical events as one’s differentia specifica.

The second characteristic of the space of competing European memories is that, besides the social dynamics of the competition of victims, positions are constituted by the European enlargement process. What makes the European debate particular in relation to other memory competitions in history is that it occurred in the midst of a thorough geopolitical restructuring triggered by the fall of the bi-polar world order. The fact that in contemporary social imagery the memory of the Holocaust appears as “Western”, while the memory of communism as “Eastern”, calls for an analysis of the spatial dimension of struggles to define Europe. The spatial problematization of transnational European politics enables us to explain how its power asymmetry, perceived by the actors as unequal recognition of memories, takes the form of a geographical east-west dichotomy. In other words, how the local and the transnational are linked. Actors making memory claims certainly strive to impose a sacralized idea of “historical experience” that determines the present naturally. According to this idea, after a period of occultation and ignorance, the memory of the Holocaust has finally acquired its rightful recognition, and with some delay, the memory of communism, a specific local historical experience, has also become gradually recognized on the transnational-European level through a bottom-up process. Normative studies of “Europe’s divided memory”, arguing for the necessary accommodation of “both events” into the European memory framework (Assmann 2011), tend to confuse commemorative causality with historical explanation (Snyder 2013) when dealing with pre-given and geographically specific historical legacies waiting there for recognition. According to this explanatory model, history causes regional
specificity (there was Communism in the East but not in the West), which automatically demands recognition (the claim that Communism existed only in the East must be acknowledged). Thus a specific interpretation of “communism” becomes the “particular historical legacy” of Eastern Europe that, as the precondition of integrating the region’s nations to Europe, has to be acknowledged as such (Kattago 2009, Malksoo 2014). However, transnational norms definitively influence the way local historical experience is represented or even, to a certain extent, re-lived. In transnational memory studies, the challenge “arises from the difficulty of analyzing and theorizing how something that depends on concrete places and unique historical episodes is shaped by processes that are globalized and to understand how the local then molds the global in turn” (Siep-Wüstenberg, 2015: 324.). The fact that “memories, especially memories of past atrocities, are spatially grounded” poses analytical problems only if one conceives this groundedness as a given. In ethnography, the problem of cultural rootedness arose three decades ago when scholars took into account the apparent interconnectedness of geographically distant social phenomena. The critique of the concept of culture as inherently rooted in geographical or natural space in the age of globalization (Gupta and Ferguson 1992, 1997) oriented scholarly attention to the social process through which the local and the global are linked. Spatial practices of “rooting” are the most visible when the seemingly natural rootedness of meanings is provoked by social transformation. The dissolution of state socialist regimes in Europe entailed a profound geopolitical restructuring in which every agent had to reposition themselves. The prevailing instrument of this repositioning was commemoration and history writing that localized the discursive positions in geographical space. The concept of localization was introduced by Maurice Halbwachs (1925), as the process of remembering through which the individual locates the image of the past in the social frameworks of memory. I use this term in a truly spatial sense when applying it to space organizing practices that provide a representation of the past: localization is a spatial practice of remembering (Zombory 2012). As will be shown in this study, the memory of communism, far from being a local initiative stemming from a specific historical experience of people, is the result of the localization of norms of historical consciousness imposed during the EU enlargement process.

In the ideological vacuum following the “end of history”, European memory, with its constituent historical experiences, took on an ideological-mythical role and has become increasingly detached from historical reality. The combination of the two particularities of the post-Cold War European social interactions, the competition of victims and the enlargement
process, entailed the cultural mimesis of the “competitors”, which further accelerated the political “bubble effect”, augmenting the gap between political memory claims and the diverse historical experience of those they make reference to. From a historical sociological perspective, this article aims to explore the origins of the European mimetic competition of victims. Unless one looks at the way competitive positions are taken in the debate around the definition of Europe, one fails to see the structural dynamics of the “comfortable controversy”; that “Each side is so palpably wrong about so many major issues that the other cannot help but feel that it must, in turn, be right” (Snyder, 2013: 88). The dynamics of “I am right because the other is wrong” is only possible if the participants are not interested in contesting the commonly shared conditions of legitimate differentiation. Because of the cultural mimesis of the competitive sides, challenging the other would be a self-destructive gesture. The mimetic competition of victims profoundly influences both “sides” and hinders the European project in providing solidarity among the citizens of different national and local histories. In what follows I shall outline the critical historical sociology of the relations between the competing memory claims in post-Cold War Europe. I begin by outlining the historical background of the currently prevailing European politics, which has its roots in the 1970s. Then I turn to the ways in which the mutual repositioning of European actors was realized as a reaction to the collapse of the bi-polar world order: first by making the memory of the Holocaust the central element of the European identity narrative in post-Cold War Western Europe, and second by the discourse of “return to Europe” in post-Cold War Eastern Europe. Subsequently, I analyze the institutionalization of the memory of communism in the late 1990s as a result of the east-west interaction of European enlargement. Finally, I discuss the main characteristics and consequences of the European mimetic competition of victims.

The end of utopia

The origins of the currently dominant form of European politics can be traced back to the 1970s, the decade that in many respects put an end to the post-war political order. The weakening of the nation-state order due to the complex processes of decolonization, globalization, and late modern capitalism, meant that political struggles overflowed from the framework of state institutions. Without the institutional channels, political claims, made increasingly in the mediatized environment of mass communication, lost direct contact with social interest groups, a circumstance which increased the role of symbolic politics and the indirect knowledge production of expert apparatuses in political representation (Csigó 2016). At the same time, the Western world experienced a radical transformation of historical
consciousness as a consequence of technological modernization, and the loss of faith in progress, caused mainly by the decrease in economic growth. Norms of the age of commemoration (Nora 1992), that of “preserving everything” and the imperative of the “duty to remember”, reflect the incertitude towards the future, which constitutes the basic cause of the crisis of politics (Leccardi 2011). In the new setting, historical remembering has become a moral obligation, a seemingly positive value in itself, in sharp opposition with forgetting, conceived of as loss and the silencing of truth.

All this was not without its effect on the European values promoted by the EU: instead of cultivating the values of peace, political stability and prosperity, the emphasis was put on cultural heritage and sites of memory (Calligaro 2015). In the new, presentist regime of historicity (Hartog, 2002) it was not at all paradoxical that the European Union, a political project par excellence, was supposed to find its principles of legitimacy not in the future-oriented goals it aimed to achieve but in references to the past. It was no longer common achievements but the common cult of heritage that would have to provide European solidarity and integration.

The post-1968 disillusionment in leftist political programs, the “end of utopia”, can be understood against the background of the structural transformation of politics and of historical consciousness. When engaged in the critique of totalitarianism (Christofferson 2004), leftist intellectuals in the West turned away not only from communism but from any kind of emancipatory movements that find their cause in utopian reference. “The very idea of revolution is criminalized, automatically reduced to the category of ‘communism’ and thus archived in the chapter ‘totalitarianism’ in the history of the twentieth century. It is equated with Terror, a Terror reduced to the consistent achievement of a criminal ideology” (Traverso, 2005: 88). The idea of revolution, and in a broader sense, the idea that the adjustment of social arrangements assuring a better life are necessarily the outcome of political action, has become discredited and has been replaced by human rights discourse. Indeed, the ideological vacuum in the 1970s was conducive to the emergence of the human rights paradigm (Moyn, 2010). In the eyes of the West, failures of the post-colonial struggles discredited the moral program of collective (national) self-determination, and 1968 shook faith in socialism as an alternative modernization. Human rights appeared as a promising retreat to pure morality from the dirty games of cold war realpolitik. However, in reality it was the continuation of politics by other means, a new sort of politics that gains its legitimacy in a different way from previous, future-oriented ideologies. In the strict sense of the word, human rights ideology is
not the last utopia, as Moyn suggests, since it lacks the future model of “good life”, a moral measure of the present that societies have to achieve by political action; on the contrary, in the prevailing regime of historicity, it finds its moral orientation in relation to the negative model of the “absolute evil” in the past. Indeed, the 1970s saw two far-reaching historical developments intertwining: the rise of the human rights discourse and construction of reterritorialized Holocaust memory as a universal symbol of Evil, a point of reference for moral judgement in the present, detached from its historical and geographical context (Alexander 2002, Levy-Sznaider 2002). Global public discourse on the Holocaust, developing in America from the late 1970s (Novick 1999) and in Israel from the 1960s (Zertal 2005) contributed greatly to the transformation of historical consciousness in the West. The Nazi genocide of the Jews represents the ultimate immorality in human civilization, and has been transformed from a historical event into a universal lesson for the present. And since the suffering of the Jews serves as an example of any human suffering, the possible atrocities to be perceived as history repeating itself are not restricted to anti-Semitism. In the developing transnational space of memory claims the state loses its control over politics and is confronted by a whole new range of actors with not negligible institutional resources. Public interest is driven by the need to “become aware” of “faults” and “crimes” committed in the past, by the need for the recognition of the victims, and by the claim for legal or symbolic reparation of the damages suffered in the past (Rousso 2007).

The other side of the Iron Curtain saw similar developments in many respects. Although one can observe neither the “memory boom” nor the cultivation of Holocaust memory in Eastern Europe, the meaning and practice of politics considerably changed among the dissidents, who after the change of regimes in 1989 would become the key figures of the new political and intellectual elites. Following “the crumbling of socialist hopes after 1968” (Judt 1988: 233) and the loss of faith in a socialism with a human face, they turned away from the Enlightenment tradition, and, in the name of “anti-politics”, engaged in the newly arisen rights language and totalitarianism framework (Traveso 2001), and thus “they brought human rights to its international public acme” (Moyn 2010: 161).

Since the 1970s, different (previously parallel) historical developments have created the conditions of possibility of a new political discourse of the age of post-utopianism. It is characterized by its reference to memory and to morality, by individualism as political subjectification, and by anti-totalitarian human rights as a program of action. In the new setting, not only does anti-fascism disappear from the political landscape, but so does
communism together with “its horizon of hope” (Traverso, 2005: 89). The question of communism will arise two decades later in the form of a European memory issue as the outcome of the post-Cold-War reorganization of continental political space.

The Western universal

Although it played an important role in international public discourses, “Until the 1990s, the memory of specific events of World War II was a black box that no political actor dared to open in the European arena” (Calligaro 2015: 338; see also Probst 2003). In the ideological vacuum generated by the definitive defeat of the Cold War enemy, the EU gradually began to embrace the global Holocaust discourse. The EP resolution in June 1995 still spoke the old language when it argued for the establishment of a Holocaust commemorational day by proper political reasoning. It insisted that “the peace in Western Europe since 1945 will not continue if the totalitarian and racist ideologies of the Nazis which led to the Holocaust of the Jews, the genocide of the gypsies, the mass murder of millions of others and to the Second World War are not prevented from spreading their pernicious influence” (EP 1995). By June 2000, the EP had already changed its discourse. According to the ‘Declaration on the remembrance of the Holocaust’ (EP 2000), the universal moral message of the memory of the Holocaust is a constitutive part of the European promotion of values. This declaration followed the Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust in January 2000, an initiative of the Swedish Prime Minister Göran Persson to strengthen Holocaust awareness. The so-called Stockholm Declaration (IHRA 2000), which was signed by 46 country representatives, declares that “the unprecedented character of the Holocaust will always hold universal meaning”, and “must be forever seared in our collective memory”. As a moral touchstone “in our understanding of the human capacity for evil and good”, the importance of the memory of the Holocaust reaches far beyond the realm of politics. Keeping alive the memory of the Holocaust is a moral obligation for the whole of humanity, because it is “still scarred by genocide, ethnic cleansing, racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia”. The signatories called on the international community “to fight those evils”, and expressed their determination to strengthen the moral commitment of their peoples and governments “to ensure that future generations can understand the causes of the Holocaust and reflect upon its consequences”. They also expressed their will to encourage “appropriate forms of Holocaust remembrance, including an annual Day of Holocaust Remembrance, in our countries”. The EP’s “Declaration on the remembrance of the Holocaust” half a year later enumerated these points of the Stockholm Declaration and “Calls on the Council and the Commission to encourage
appropriate forms of Holocaust remembrance, including an annual European Day of Holocaust Remembrance”. The moral commitment to the memory of the Holocaust was no longer framed within a particular political objective (peace); it now found its conditions of legitimacy in universal relevance.

The EU’s integration policy underwent an additional transformation when, as a reaction to the post-Cold War geopolitical reorganization, it localized the transnational memory of the Holocaust as a European historical experience with universal significance. The EU presidency statement of 31 October 2005, making reference to the Stockholm Declaration, affirmed: “The significance of the Holocaust is universal. But it commands a place of special significance in European remembrance. It is in Europe that the Holocaust took place” (EU 2005). The “special significance” of the Holocaust in European memory derives from the fact that the Holocaust as “the negative core event of the 20th century” (Diner 2003: 43) took place on the continent. After the “cult of heritage”, the third wave of Europeanization (Karlsson, 2010) is based on “a common European canon of remembrance” “against the backdrop of the memory of the Holocaust as the constituting, in effect the inaugural event of a commonly shared European memory” (Diner 2003: 42). It is now the historical lesson of the memory of the Holocaust that is supposed to provide solidarity and sense of belonging to European citizens. The question is not whether or not in reality the memory of the Holocaust constitutes the “negative founding myth” of Europe (Diner 2003); “the attempt to interpret the commemoration of the Holocaust this way is part of the increasing efforts to create a new overarching and significant founding myth” (Probst 2003: 56) for the political community of the continent. What is remarkable is that the European political project finds its conditions of legitimacy in references to this “founding myth”. The fact that this common canon does not yet exist, spurs the European institutions to foster its creation both inside its borders and, through the Enlargement process, in countries to be integrated.

As soon as Europe engaged in the universalist Holocaust discourse and the politics of commemoration (Gensburger-Lavabre 2012), it faced the problem of managing the resulting memory competition. All the more so because due to the contagious exceptionalism (Snyder 2013: 88) stemming from the uniqueness claim, the political competition of victimized social groups did not remain limited to the victims of Nazi persecution. In the attempt to resolve the escalating social conflicts around the claims of historical victimization, European models of reconciliation (Jouhanneau and Neumayer, 2014) have been introduced and prescribed for the actors. The principal model of reconciliation has become the integration of different memories
into a common framework entailing solidarity along with commonly shared values, and the public recognition of the historical suffering of victims. The first ceremony of the EP commemorating the 50th anniversary of the end of the Second World War was consecrated to the memory of the bombing of Dresden. The President of the EP, Klaus Hänsch, “Europeanized the experience of war” when he suggested that the suffering of German civilians had been similar to those of the inhabitants of bombed Coventry, Leningrad or Rotterdam; he stated that “There is no question of weighing wrong against wrong and victim against victim. In joining together to remember the horrors of the past, we shall allow reconciliation to blossom” (Calligaro 2015: 338). The optimistic scenario of blossoming is certainly in opposition with the universal significance of Jewish victimization, which calls into question its potential to reduce political conflict by the mutual recognition of the suffering of each and every victimized group.

By the 1990s, the ideological corner stone of the European political project had ceased to be antifascism. From the coalition of a collective fight against Nazism and its war, the lesson of the Second World War has become the triumph of liberal democracy over the totalitarian regimes of the 20th century. As Traverso ironically formulates: “Once the Janus-faced monster [was] beheaded, the West has had a makeover, almost a new virginity. If Nazism and Communism are the bitter enemies of the West, it ceases to be the cradle of them just to become their victim, liberalism assuming the role of its redeemer” (Traverso, 2005: 90-91). The founding myth of Europe rewritten, the core values of “Europeanness” are promoted through commemorating the Jewish genocide as European historical experience with a universal relevance. The moral order articulated by the commemoration of the Holocaust has become the standard of civilization imposed by Europe’s international policy: both in the so-called integration process and in the vocation of maintaining human kind’s universal rights in the world. From the European perspective, the EU enlargement appeared as a process of integration through which the continental civilization reunites according to its supposedly universal values. It followed that the norms of European historical consciousness were imposed as criteria of membership on associated countries, as proof of democratic commitment, even of being civilized, that is, “European”.

Return to Europe

The dissolution of the Eastern Bloc was conceived as a “transition from dictatorship to democracy”, a teleological process leading to the full-scale establishment of the Western-type
political and economic system. Since any alternative to political liberalism and free market capitalism was unimaginable on both sides of the enlargement process, the role of symbolical politics increased in the political arena. Post-communist countries positioned themselves as “returning to Europe”, as already European nations that, by an accident of history, were stuck outside Western civilization in the past. Presenting oneself as European on the international scene was the main symbolic discursive strategy in enlargement negotiations, so as to stigmatize the other as non-European, that is, Eastern. The discourse of “returning to Europe”, uniting the two strategic movements of reformulating national identity and European orientation (Zombory, 2012), played a crucial role in the geopolitical repositioning until the late 1990s.

This Europe-discourse dates back to the 1980s when dissident intellectuals of Eastern Europe strove to redraw the continent’s binary civilizational map by positioning themselves as Central European. The intellectual movement around the concept of Central Europe was an influential yet short-lived attempt to take part in the definition of European values. As Milan Kundera (1983) emphatically formulated in his renowned essay, Central European nations, kidnapped by the East, culturally belong to the Western civilization despite the Eastern political oppression. In 1956 or in 1968, they showed their real affiliation to Europe by rising against the oppressing Eastern civilization. In this cultural imagery, the fall of the communist regimes finally moved the civilizational border between East and West back eastwards, to where it had originally been located, so finally Central European nations are part of Europe politically too. Though the idea of Central Europe lost its political significance in the late 1990s, the main narrative of reclaiming Europeanness remained influential.

In post-89 state politics, the idea of return became the primary source of legitimacy in former Eastern Europe (Lagerspetz 1999). The claim of returning to Europe differentiated “ours” from the previous “Eastern” regime, and proved countries’ democratic credentials to the European institutions. For the new political elites that have been engaged in the Europe-discourse well before 1989, post-socialist politics also meant the return to the nation that was allegedly oppressed by communism (in fact, communist regimes had strongly institutionalized national categories while sanctioning certain forms of nationalism (Brubaker, 1996)). Since in these countries the “memory boom” coincided with the change of political regime, the social value attributed to memory increased considerably: it has become one of the main methods of producing historical truth. The discourse of return to historical truth through national memory construed the previous system as based on lies. The change of regime was recounted as the
historical victory of truth over a political and economic failure unsuccessfully whitewashed by the communist elite, and as the national recovery from decades-long oppression. In the post-communist political imagination, the previous era was perceived as an unnatural interlude, from which nations have to return to normalcy. State socialism was bracketed in the new national narratives as the dead end of history, a period in which the anti-European and anti-national East ruled.

The discourse of returning to Europe construed the political subject as a previously oppressed nation wishing to continue history from the point it swerved onto the “wrong” track with the communist takeover. This is why new elites tended to draw on the symbolic repertoire of the interwar period. The ultimate legitimizing strategy of the new regimes was to distance themselves from the communist past, producing a radical symbolic break with it in the re-enactment of what they considered the historically true, that is, national past in every sector of society. As legislation on the restitution of nationalized property or the restorationist citizenship policies in Baltic States (particularly Estonia and Latvia) show, the significance of the discourse on the return to Europe extended far beyond the realm of the symbolic. In the international context, the symbolical distancing of communism was supposed to serve as proof of European, that is, Western qualities.

Accordingly, what was commemorated in the 1990s was not at all “communism” but the allegedly oppressed nation. The founding myth of the new democracy rested on the idea that the revolutions in 1956 or 1968, cultivated now as national uprising and political resistance against communism, would finally be completed; their demands once rejected, would now be realized. The new elites tended to frame negotiated transitions as legitimate culminations of earlier anti-communist struggles. The temporality of “transition to democracy”, no longer under Eastern oppression but not yet in Western liberty, was highly future-oriented and attributed social meaning to the deeds of the nation in commemorative narratives, especially to the sacrifice it had made for freedom. National suffering was presented as the result of a heroic fight for Europeanness), a sacrifice that had to be taken into account when assessing the countries at the gates of Europe. Accordingly, it was mainly the classic technology of nation-building that inspired the memory politics of post-communist countries in the 1990s. Cultural representation of the past relied heavily on the heroic historical role of the nation fighting for independence, for instance in defending Europe, or on its allegedly ancient European attributes such as freedom and tolerance. One cannot speak of an officially supported memory of communism during this period. The denial of the communist experience
(Judt 1992) went hand in hand with the reconstruction of the nation as non-communism. As a result, antifascist ideology has been completely delegitimized and discredited as the communists’ malign manipulation in order to maintain their despotic domination over the nation.

As for spatial repositioning, commemorative narratives, in which the civilizational border moved while the peoples below it remained in place, localized the present-day nation between East and West, in the perceived transitional “nowhere land” that is no longer situated in the East but is not yet in Europe. It was against this background that countries aspiring to EU membership were called upon to fulfil the “soft” EU-membership criterion (Leggewie 2007) of historical consciousness as an entry ticket to the European club. Presenting oneself successfully as a European nation required a particular relation to the past together with specific modes of memorial representation, with “coming to terms with the past” being in the center. During the accession process post-socialist countries were interpellated as subjects that have to overcome successfully the burden of 40 year-long totalitarian communism to be able to become European. As the moment of EU accession drew closer, and became more institutionalized, the European position of countries in the “nowhere land” became more certain. Post-communist states have gradually obtained more resources and grounds for their claims in the transnational space of politics, and were able to represent themselves as different in a legitimate way, that is, according to the rules of the game. State-supported memory of communism emerged as a result of this process.

**The Eastern specific**

In post-communist countries, state efforts to “come to terms with” their totalitarian pasts were manifested in various forms of institutionalization, which provided space for and gave credence to political claims. They channeled an already existing pan-European scholarly discourse of historical revisionism aiming to condemn communism in a legitimate way. *Le livre noir du communism* (“The Black Book of Communism”, 1997) is exemplary both in terms of its creation in an east-west cooperation, and its impact on political claims of communism-memory. The book largely contributed to the legitimacy of condemning communism by juxtaposing it with Nazism, and identifying it, in line with the subtitle, with crime, terror and repression. The complete argumentative repertoire is there in the introduction: the equal criminality of communism underpinned by the equal moral respect for the human dignity of victims, the Nuremberg Trials as a model to accuse communism of
crimes against humanity and genocide, the great task of reconstructing a common memory of Europe by finally integrating the so far forgotten, even suppressed memory of communism, and the role of the historian as a spokesperson for the victims, obeying not only the “duty to history” but also the “duty to memory” (Courtois 1997). This scholarly discourse juxtaposes communism and Nazism in the framework of the quasi-scholarly concept of totalitarianism, particularly its anti-communist version elaborated in the 1970s by leftist French intellectuals criticizing the politics of the French Communist Party (Christofferson 2004). As a novelty in relation to former pieces of anti-communist critique of anti-totalitarianism, the Black Book, beyond providing scientific arguments for condemning communism as an equally criminal system as Nazism, or even more so, performed the revision of history by a memory claim made in relation to the Holocaust. Its performative potential derives from *reclaiming the memory of communism* against the alleged oblivion, even occultation of its crimes. Unlike victims of Nazism, the argument goes, victims of communism are not recognized, their human dignity is not respected. This inequality is morally unacceptable, all the more so because they were more numerous than the victims of Nazism. From the moral obligation of equal respect for the suffering of innocent victims follows the historically untenable thesis of equal criminality of the two systems (Rousso 2004: 4). The strategy of reclaiming the memory of communism is legitimized by the modalities of Holocaust-memory: by the imperative of “Never again!”, by the calling to restore the dignity of its victims, by commemoration of past suffering as a means to avoid the repetition of the traumatic past. This discursive alchemy turns a particular interpretation of communism into a memory with eternal truth and a moral lesson which is acceptable because of the European modalities of its creation.

Compared to its scholarly nature, the Black Book project made a remarkable political influence on the continent. In post-communist countries, the book was translated, discussed at conferences, and referred to in public debates. Courtois’s arguments, especially his controversial comparison between the 100 million victims of communism against 25 million victims of Nazism (1997: 25) were often presented, without the debate it triggered in France and the international scholarly field (Aronson 2003), as rock-solid historical evidence of communism’s criminality, sometimes even as a well-known fact, without indicating the source (e.g. Schmidt 2003[1999]: 12). They influenced the museal representation of communism, such as the exhibition “Two Faces of Totalitarianism: Twentieth Century Europe”, organized by the Polish Karta Center in Warsaw 2005 (Main: 2008: 389). Courtois personally and directly contributed to the political and institutional reclaim of the memory of
communism, as a participant of scholarly events organized in post-communist countries, as a member of the Scientific Board of the International Center for Studies into Communism, affiliated to the Sighet Memorial Museum in Sighetu Marmatiei, and as rector of the annual summer school organized by its background foundation that even published his respective lectures in Romanian (Courtois 2003).

State-initiated institutions of memory and history also contributed to the implementation of a legitimate discourse on the past. In 1998 the three state presidents of the Baltics initiated the formation of national commissions of historians to study the “crimes against humanity” of both Nazism and Communism (Onken 2007). The work of the commissions, which included acknowledged political figures and experts from the Western world, aimed to legitimize the construction of communism-memory as a symbol of Evil while avoiding international criticism for relativizing or marginalizing the memory of the Holocaust. The strategy of juxtaposing suffering from Nazism and Communism, the official terminology of “double genocide”, was the outcome of this “reconciliation process” (Budryte 2005: 184–186). The final report of The Presidential Commission for the Analysis of Communist Dictatorship, initiated by Romanian President Traian Băsescu in 2006 and chaired by Vladimir Tismăneanu, an acknowledged American political scientist with Romanian origin, provided a scholarly basis for the Romanian president to officially condemn communism as illegitimate and criminal. The president declared, among others in the parliament: “Imported from the USSR, the communist ideology justified the assault against civil society, against political and economic pluralism; it justified the annihilation of the democratic parties, the destruction of the free market, extermination by assassination, deportation, forced labor, and the imprisonment of hundreds of thousands of people.” (Quoted in Apor 2011: 573) The anachronistic and anatopistic application of concepts of civil society, political and economic pluralism, democratic parties or the free market to the social-political reality of 1940s Romania clearly showed that moral and ideological stakes happened to be far more important in the President’s statement than historical understanding (cf. Mark 2010: 38). Similarly to the Baltic historical commissions, it served as a discursive laboratory for Europeanizing communism by representing it according to the model of canonic Holocaust-memory and by implementing a legitimate discourse on the past. The Romanian case well demonstrates the rootedness of communism-memory in the pan-European east-west cooperation of actors, since it was the historical commission that in 2006 recommended the creation of a Museum of Communist Dictatorship that “like the Holocaust Memorial in Washington, would be both a
place of memory and an affirmation of the values of the open society” (quoted in Badica 2013:113). As the site of the Memorial Museum for the Victims of Communism, Râmnicu Sărat, a former prison, has been chosen (see Badica 2013).

When visualizing and materializing the discourse of anticommunist critique of totalitarianism, memorial-museums perform the reclaiming of the “forgotten” memory of communism. Their exhibitions create a political space which is organized according to the equality of victimhood. They constitute a binary political space in which the stake is the legitimate comparison of the two symbols of Evil in history. In memorial-museums, even in those depicting only the repression under communist regimes, communism appears as a similar counterpart to Nazism. “The depiction of communism solely as a terror regime conspicuously next to the already established icon of violence, Nazism, is an attempt to transform the Gulag into a counter-Auschwitz, to construct an understanding of the history of communism as the twin of the ultimate horrors of Nazism and as the Eastern double of the ultimate catastrophe of European civilization” (Apor 2012: 574). The construction of this relation is based on the ideology of totalitarianism, presenting both systems as essentially characterized by terror and crime, in other words, by the violation of the human rights of innocent individuals. In the political space of comparison, which is in fact the space of competition, the diverse historical experience of four decades of state socialism is transformed into a uniform historical trauma, as equally unimaginable as the Holocaust, that is also detached from the historical complexity of the Second World War – what can be debated, then, is the degree of human suffering in the two cases. It is against the background of the space of equal victims that one of the most important arguments of challenging the uniqueness claim of the Holocaust is formulated: the West applies double standards when recognizing and restoring the dignity of the victims of Nazism while denying the same to the victims of communism.

The re-appropriation of the norms of legitimate historical consciousness by post-communist countries entailed the modification of anti-communist revisionism. While the Black Book deals with communism as a world phenomenon, in the post-communist context Communism-memory came into existence not only as European but also as Eastern. Its specificity in relation to universalist Holocaust-memory is not historical but geographical. The Hungarian House of Terror Museum in Budapest, created from the national budget, was inaugurated by the Prime Minister in February 2002, two months before the general elections. The opening ceremony took place at the building that had served as headquarters of the pro-Hitler Hungarian Arrow Cross party in 1944 and subsequently as that of the state security forces, led
by the Communist Party, until 1951. Viktor Orbán, justifying the establishment of the institution, similarly to Băsescu, by the duty to remember, devoted largely his speech to the building (Orbán 2002). “This house is a memento. Living suffering” – he said. “We locked two dictatorships together within the walls of this house. They stem from different sources, but you can see, they get on well with each other. This is not coincidental. There's no need to evade our own responsibility, but our children need to know that both dictatorships were systems that would not have been able either to gain or maintain power in our country without the support of foreign armies.” The fact that the site deals with individual suffering and death turns the museum into a monument, a site of mourning. To the criticism that the House of Terror Museum was created and opened as part of the political campaign of the ruling right-wing party, the director of the institution, personal consultant of the Prime Minister, replied that those who project political issues onto her institution “are incapable of paying tribute to the memory of the victims” (Schmidt 2003: 179); the House of Terror is supposed to foster common thinking about the last decades, so that “finally the work of mourning begin, the necessity of which is so incontestably described by our Nobel Laureate, Imre Kertész, in relation to the Holocaust” (Schmidt 2003: 185).

The House of Terror Museum does not hold the monopoly on the localization of the memory of communism at sites of former political violence and human suffering. The Sighet Memorial, Râmnicu Sărat, or the Museum of Genocide Victims in Vilnius (1992) are also located at former political prisons. The Museum of Occupations in Riga took the building that until 1991 housed the museum for the Latvian Riflemen, a group that supported the Bolsheviks during the Russian revolution and the ensuing civil war. Considerable efforts have been made to erase the ideologically undesirable reminiscence of the building’s history (Mark 2008: 362–3), and the museum even planned to move to the former building of the NKVD in Riga (Denis 2011). Though located in a new building constructed for its own purpose, the Museum of Occupations in Tallinn also aims, according to the objectives of the host institution, to be “a tombstone for the thousands of countrymen buried in anonymous graves” (The Kistler-Ritso Estonian Foundation 1998).

The main strategy of historical representation of these institutions is that they rely on the “spirit of the place”: the genius loci, embedded in the material building or site, is not subjected to historical change. The sites of exhibition are thus supposed to be the “objective witnesses” of history, establishing the identity of past and present (the site left as it was used at the time of political violence). It follows that the memorial site acquires the meanings of a
crime scene where, according to the European vocabulary, human rights were severely violated. In domestic politics, the location of memorial-museums made it possible to discredit the post-communist Left, while on the international scene, it made communism site specific. Reclaiming the memory of a Europeanized communism produced a legitimate historical experience that differentiates the newcomers from the “old member states”. The idea of “double victimhood” has become the differentia specifica of post-communist countries, positioning themselves as Eastern Europe that is, specifically European, who lived through both totalitarian regimes in the 20th century, not only Nazism. This served as a symbolic resource in the ongoing transnational competition of culturally identical “historical experiences”. The memory of communism has been localized as specifically East European, as a counterpart to European Holocaust-memory, perceived as Western.

In a certain sense, European norms of historical consciousness have been nationalized. In the European discourse on Holocaust-memory, which positioned the local authorities and populations as collaborator, and thus continuously undermined national pride and self-esteem especially in the eyes of the political right, the memory of communism could be presented as the other dark side of history. National pride is paradoxically to be regained by the degree of suffering under communist repression, allegedly severer than under Nazism. Reducing the memory of the state socialist period exclusively to terror and violence is, besides demonstrating the brutality and inhuman nature of communist rule, supposed to represent the regime as an alien force that society, conceived as nation, had nothing to do with except for being the innocent victim of it, and enduring foreign domination. It follows that communism is represented in sharp contrast with the nation: communism is isolated from the nation and essentially anti-national; so the nation is anti-communist, an innocent victim not tainted by totalitarian, terroristic and criminal communism. The true subject of history is the nation whose ahistorical, eternal and homogeneous essence is represented in relation to the meanings attributed to communism. Less than a decade after the collapse of communist regimes, the region witnessed a considerable change in national discourse. The symbolical distancing of the communist past took another form: from the dead end of history, an unmarked signifier, communism has been transformed into the symbol of the evil of History, the ultimate perpetrator that is worthily commemorated and condemned together with Nazism. The nation, characteristically represented before as the heroic protagonist in the narrative of historical struggles of the mythic forces of West and East, is now being constructed as an East European community of victims, repressed by both totalitarian regimes but mainly by communism. The
legitimate political subject position for the associated countries was the outcome of mimetic victimization.

**Conclusion**

When the institutional context of competing for the definition of Europe was radically transformed with the EU membership of the post-communist countries, which were subsequently able to influence European politics from the inside as institutionally equal partners, the chances of a subversion of the normative regime of historical consciousness were already gone. Since new member states had already appropriated the norms of legitimate difference before legal accession, the debate about the meanings of Europe was reduced to the mimetic competition of victims whose memories are similar enough not to prevent the other’s claim for recognition. In fact, they only differ in terms of their geographical localization. New member states could acquire a legitimate subject position, that is, Europeanness, only by proving their democratic qualities, expressed by the cultivation of universalist Holocaust-memory. They positioned themselves as specifically Eastern by additionally reclaiming the memory of communism in a European way. As a symbolic resource in political struggles, the “historical experience of communism” served as a legitimate difference in relation to the universality of European Holocaust-memory. Their claim challenged universality and revealed the European project to be particularly Western. Since the two sides of the power relation took the positions of East and West, the Cold War civilizational divide has been reproduced in a new form. Far from being the consequence of given different historical legacies, the east-west divide of European memory landscape is the result of the struggle for the legitimate principles of difference.

The EP resolution on “European conscience and totalitarianism” in 2009 that canonized the memory of communism as constitutive to European identity is the outcome of the mimetic competition of self-victimizing actors. Both sides of the debate were rhetorically entrapped (Schimmelfennig 2001) by the other. On the one hand, opponents of the initiative to recognize communism as criminal, terrorist and totalitarian were silenced because its promoters referred to legitimate European norms of historical consciousness: the memory of the Holocaust, the need for reconciliation, commonly shared values expressed in a historical narrative, the duty to remember, the restoration of the dignity of victims, etc. On the other hand, proponents of the initiative were silenced because, in order to be capable, as European agents, of raising their cause of communism-memory, they had to previously adopt the
opponent’s cause of Holocaust-memory together with its representational regime. This double rhetorical entrapment considerably limited the potential of the debate on Europe’s historical legacies.

The repositioning of the political field by the claims of the “newcomers” also modified the “rules of the game”. First, the conditions of legitimacy have been destabilized but not changed, which resulted in a situation of “neither won the game”. The 2009 resolution legitimizes the binary political space with its acknowledgement that “the dominant historical experience of Western Europe was Nazism, and (...) Central and Eastern European countries have experienced both Communism and Nazism”, and speaks of the “double legacy of dictatorship borne by these countries” (EP 2009). Though the memory of Communism is recognized as European, the resolution also declares that “the uniqueness of the Holocaust must nevertheless be acknowledged”. The urge behind the resolution is clearly to unite Europe, which necessitates “form[ing] a common view of its history”, yet it respects inner differences as an east-west divide of historical legacies of past suffering. Second, the political repositioning led to the escalation of victimization. The “common view of history”, called for in the resolution, has been restricted to the “tragic past” conceived as human rights violations. In this view of the past, possible moral judgement can only separate criminalized totalitarian regimes of whatever ideology on the one hand, and the conglomerate of suffering innocent individuals on the other. Although the heroes of resistance are mentioned in the resolution, the only memory community this policy enables to construct is the collectivity of victims, the boundaries of which are demarcated by pure human suffering. As the document clearly puts it, “from the perspective of the victims it is immaterial which regime deprived them of their liberty or tortured or murdered them for whatever reason”.

The causes of the mimetic competition of victims are to be found in the two interrelated features of the post-Cold War political space in Europe: the uniqueness claim of the Holocaust, and the enlargement process. Its consequence is increasing de-politicization, both in terms of temporality and subjectivity. Instead of targeting the future and take action in order to make history, politics is reduced to retroactive reactions in the name of the “anti-historical” imperative to avoid the repetition of historical traumas. The growing relevance of the subject position of the former victim in public discourse biases politics since victimhood is exclusively retrospective and reifies political claims as natural. Victimhood is “an a-political notion, since it pursues no other political goal than the celebration of a communion of victimhood that cannot be questioned” (Lagrou 2011: 283). The community of victims,
since it is demarcated by meaningless past suffering, cannot change; its boundaries cannot be traversed or displaced; belonging to it is beyond human action. This bio-politics of emotions (especially of pain) inevitably leads to the competition of the social groups while preventing any agreement on matters of political conflict. Any criticism of victimization is hindered by experiencing such criticism as denial of existence, as “a reiteration of the original crime through the insult inflicted on the victims and their descendants” (Lagrou 2011: 286). The mutual public recognition of past suffering, offered as political solution, legitimizes victimization as the only condition of political subjectivity without modifying the power relations of the actors. Historical knowledge is sacrificed on the altar of reconciliation. It is not possible to learn from history since the relation to the past is limited to the commemoration of the mythical symbols of Evil, deprived of their historical context and turned into an ethical inoculation against de-contextualized totalitarian crimes.

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Bibliography


"Mimetic" redirects here. For the mimetic muscles, see Facial muscles. For other uses of the word Mimesis, see Mimesis (disambiguation). Not to be confused with Memetics. Girard notes the productive potential of competition: "It is because of this unprecedented capacity to promote competition within limits that always remain socially, if not individually, acceptable that we have all the amazing achievements of the modern world," but states that competition stifles progress once it becomes an end in itself: "rivals are more apt to forget about whatever objects are the cause."