and women automatically disqualify women for combat roles. The USS Cole had a mixed-gender compliment in October of 2000 and the heroism on the part of the entire crew saved that ship. This reviewer served with women in combat during Operation Enduring Freedom and the fighting efficiency was not impaired, even during the longest at-sea deployment (158 days without a port visit) since World War II. Mixed-gender crews have served on combatant ships since the early 1990s; lessons were learned early on and, simply stated, good leadership and an effective command climate is essential to training a combat capable team and conducting operations. The ship has sailed on this issue.

There is much to recommend in *Navy Strategic Culture*. The author has written eloquently on the unique role of the Navy and its contribution to national defense strategy. In particular, the Navy’s sister service officers will gain an education in the capabilities and thought processes required to put together a joint team. Barnett dilutes his powerful message, however, when he editorializes and tries to speak for current Navy strategists.

---

**Blood on the Snow: The Carpathian Winter War of 1915**

by Graydon A. Tunstall

Reviewed by Colonel James D. Scudieri, Deputy Dean, US Army War College

The Eastern Front of the Great War has arguably been the poor cousin of the Western Front as the First World War has been compared with the Second, in terms of renown. Tunstall has gone much further afield in his emphasis on just the Austro-Hungarian Carpathian Winter Campaign of 1915. His work is quite concise, a mere 212 pages of text in only six chapters. The first is the “Introduction,” takes about 15 percent of the space, and sets the stage for several key points. He returns to these key points throughout the text. Indeed, he reinforces them immediately and at length in the first chapter entitled “Background to the Battles,” which describes the preliminary operations and preparations for the “First Offensive.”

Tunstall soon establishes his focus on the Austro-Hungarian forces. He devotes considerable effort articulating the seemingly-insurmountable challenges that confronted the army of Franz Joseph. First, the author reiterates several times that the devastating losses by December 1914 had reduced the Hapsburg army to a militia. The casualties had been crippling, not merely in terms of simple numbers, but in particular among the professional officer corps, trained and educated to deal with a multi-ethnic military. Troops were increasingly older, less hardy, and lacked adequate training. In essence, the Austro-Hungarian Army suffered some 50 percent casualties overall in the opening operations during 1914.
Second, the Carpathian Front lacked the requisite infrastructure, especially transportation, to sustain large forces. Indeed, pre-war planning deemed the Carpathians a pass-through vice maneuver zone. Two tables and detailed discussion highlight the herculean-like efforts required to concentrate, reinforce, and sustain forces in this theater. The Austro-Hungarian railroad system lacked both capability and capacity for major, offensive operations here. The wintry weather degraded already-limited roads.

Third, the failure of the plan to achieve rapid success necessitated the unprecedented, prolonged conduct of operations in mountains during winter. The extreme temperatures at high elevation accounted for many more casualties than combat among troops lacking uniforms and equipment for winter warfare. These conditions also rendered every type of action more difficult, the more so as a Hapsburg planning assumption was surprise. Why, then, attack?

Three factors beckoned Hötzendorf to the Carpathian Front. The first was Russian success. Czarist troops were postured to complete their transit of the Carpathians and spill south onto the Hungarian plain, a potentially devastating blow to morale. The second was what appeared to be the moral, political, and military imperative to push the Russians back north, relieve the fortress of Przemyśl, and reclaim the province of Galicia. Finally, a major Hapsburg success was necessary to discourage Italian and Rumanian entrance into the war with the Triple Entente.

Hötzendorf’s cherished offensive, launched with 20½ divisions from Second and South Armies on 23 January 1915, failed. Poor visibility, ice, and heavy snow stymied combined-arms operations. The Russians defended stoutly. An aggressive General Nikolai Yudevich Ivanov was unrelenting in his counterattacks; he sought the dreaded invasion of the Hungarian plain. A second attempt began on 27 February. Heavy snow alternated with thaws and commensurate temperature fluctuations. Nonetheless, this attack was the only occasion when the Austrians had numerical superiority over the Russians, forty-one divisions from Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin, Third, Second, and South Armies. They failed for similar reasons which defeated the first attack. Tunstall’s table of the paltry artillery support available to Second Army units in this regard is telling, though it accomplished some success. Indeed, Tunstall states that front-line units reached within fifty kilometers of Przemyśl. A third attack, launched on 20 March—a day later than a breakout attempt from Przemyśl—also failed, for the same general reasons. The fortress surrendered on 22 March, freeing besieging Russian troops to reinforce their Carpathian units. Worse, remorseless Russian counterattacks developed into a concerted offensive to sever Second and Third Armies and spill onto the Hungarian plain. Second Army in particular was hard pressed to prevent a Russian breakthrough. Ultimately, a combined Austro-German counterattack in early April known as Easter Battle salvaged the situation, but Russian attacks occurred until 20 April.

No surprise, Tunstall has written a blistering assessment of the Austrian High Command in general and Hötzendorf in particular. His critiques go back to Austrian pre-war planning through the disasters of 1914. Then Austrian
leaders stubbornly and/or blindly assumed that the 1915 operations would be brief. He concludes that the greatest Austrian efforts still constituted inadequate preparation, resulting in failure to mass and insufficient reserves. Instead, sustained winter, and mountain operations involved no less than two-thirds of the Austro-Hungarian Army, cost another 800,000 casualties, and seriously damaged its resiliency. The defeat led directly to determined German intervention and decisive victory at Gorlice-Tarnow, but at the price of diminished freedom of action in light of powerful German assistance.

The book has a fairly-easy style, but there are challenges. The author discusses numerous units from field army to division; at times the reader is hard pressed to follow. An order of battle could have mitigated some confusion. The text incorporates nine maps; six are in the preliminary Introduction and Chapter 1. Similar level of map support of the Second and Third Offensives would have been helpful. Finally, Tunstall writes with many superlatives, rightly hammering home the sheer scope of the Carpathian Campaign. The reader must digest these statistics carefully and often; otherwise, they sometimes appear contradictory.

The book is a detailed case study, based on extensive primary-source research, of an attempt to devise a viable strategy to meet drastically-changed, unforeseen conditions with impending crisis—and with an increasingly domineering ally. In that sense it is of interest to senior leaders today. The detailed description of the campaign with its three principal actions may be excessive for the nonmilitary historian.

**Warrior’s Rage: The Great Tank Battle of 73 Easting**
by Douglas Macgregor

Reviewed by Jim Shufelt, COL (USA Retired), Center for Strategic Leadership, US Army War College

Either loved or hated by his military readers, Douglas Macgregor has never pulled his punches when expressing his ideas about history, military strategy, Army Transformation, or related issues. Warrior’s Rage, his autobiographical account of the Battle of 73 Easting during the First Iraq War, accompanied by his analysis of the long-term strategic impact of the battle, is another Macgregor book that will be either wholeheartedly accepted or rejected by its readers because of its explicit descriptions, sharp analysis, and blunt conclusions. Some Army senior leaders from that conflict may find it uncomfortable, as the author has no problem naming names in his analysis of tactical, operational, and strategic decisions before, during, and after the battle. Regardless, it is an enthralling story of combat and its conclusions will challenge many past and serving strategic leaders.
Blood on the Snow book. Read 4 reviews from the world's largest community for readers. The Carpathian campaign of 1915, described by some as the "Stalingrad of the First World War," engaged the million-man armies of Austria-Hungary and Russia in fierce winter combat that drove them to the brink of annihilation. Habsburg forces fought to rescue 130,000 Austro-Hungarian soldiers trapped by Russian troops in Fortress Przemysl, but the campaign was waged under such adverse circumstances that it produced six times as many casualties as the number besieged. It remains one of the least understood and most devastating chapters of the war—a horrific episode only glimpsed previo...
The war ministry retained the favor of parliamentary delegates toward the army by proving efficient and responsible, yet needlessly spent large sums on permanent fortresses because of the fear of fighting numerically superior opponents on multiple fronts. However, the early 1890s brought about a turning point in Austro-Hungarian military history with the appointment of Conrad, considered an innovative and progressive thinker, as tactical instructor at the war college in 1888 and the death of Archduke Albrecht in 1895. These changes resulted in a return to the errors of 1866.