Cultural Geographies of Counter-Diasporic Migration: The Second Generation Returns ‘Home’

Sussex Migration Working Paper No 45

Russell King and Anastasia Christou
University of Sussex
January 2008

Abstract

This paper introduces the notion of ‘counter-diasporic migration’ as the process whereby the second generation relocates to the ancestral homeland – the birthplace of their parents. We review and critically analyse the three key literatures that frame this process – on the second generation, on diasporas and on return migration – and find that all of them say very little about the transnational links and return movements of this migrant generation. In the final part of the paper we examine issues of home, identity, place and belonging as constitutive elements of the cultural geography of second-generation return. Although the paper is essentially a review and (re)conceptualisation, throughout the account we weave an empirical thread relating to recent research carried out by the authors on the return of second-generation Greek-Americans and Greek-Germans to their ancestral home in Greece.
Introduction

Feeling Greek is to feel emotionally and physically connected to the land. My home is my homeland. Once I got here for good I felt immediately united with the land, at one with the soil... It was a mythic return... I went to the cemetery and touched the earth near my grandfather’s grave. As it ran though my fingers I felt it run through my veins... No more a stranger in a strange land, this is where I belong (journal entry, second-generation Greek-American returnee to Greece, from Christou and King 2006: 823–4).

This paper is about a particular migrant group – the second generation, and its ‘return’ ‘home’. Straightaway it must be acknowledged that these terms are problematic. First, the term ‘second-generation migrant’ is an oxymoron: they are not migrants, but born in a host society of migrant parents. Hence they are not ‘return migrants’ in the strict sense, but first-time emigrants to their parents’ country of origin. Second, there are issues around the precise definition of who comprises the second generation as well as wider debates surrounding the utility of the notion of ‘generation’ in population and migration studies. These questions will be addressed presently. Our main objective in this paper is to explore the meanings associated with comprehending how this group reflects on itself, both individually and as a collectivity. In order to sharpen this reflection, we focus on the chronotope of the ‘return’ of the second generation to their ancestral home, problematising both the notions of ‘home’ and ‘return’ in this particular context. We also suggest how research on the second generation might be reformulated to achieve a more dialogic understanding of its members.

The past decade or so has seen intensive research on the second generation in the United States, and some of this research interest is now being replicated in Europe. There is less of an echo in the United Kingdom where the specific use of the term ‘second generation’ is less common, being subsumed under the general framing of minority ethnic communities. And yet, in everyday life, such events as 7/7 (the London bombings of summer 2005), strongly indicate that this generation is not fully understood, especially in relation to such fluid notions as ‘belonging’ and ‘identity’, which appear suddenly volatile. Furthermore, very little research has been conducted on the second generation’s connections to the ancestral homeland and their very complex and ambiguous views of ‘home’. We nominate the term ‘counter-diasporic migration’ to describe the return to the diasporic hearth of descendants of the original migrants who were ‘scattered’. This lineage of descendency can either be recent (e.g. the second generation) or it can be more historically remote (return to the land of the ancient ancestors); we concentrate on the former.

The paper is in four parts, each built around a keyword in the title. First we say more about counter-diasporic migration and frame this within the broader context of ongoing debates about the nature of diaspora and typologies of orientation and movement to an imagined or actual ancestral home. Second, we focus on the definition and problematisation of the second generation. We introduce a new perspective which addresses important dimensions of second-generation mobility and ‘return’. This leads naturally into our third section, which examines the literature on return migration and its applicability to the second generation. Finally we explore some cultural-geographic implications of second-generation return particularly as it affects questions of ‘home’, ‘belonging’ and ‘identity’.

Although this is essentially a review paper which tries to capture, and bring together in an instructive and novel way, a set of literatures relating to migration, diaspora, and the second generation, there is an empirical thread running through our account which draws both on previous work by the authors and on new research which is the pilot phase of a project currently under way on the return of second-generation Greek-Americans, Greek-Germans and British-born Greek Cypriots to their respective diaspora ‘homelands’. Towards the end of the paper we introduce a number of quotes from Demetra, a Greek-American who ‘returned’ to Greece six years ago, and Rebecca, a Greek-German who relocated three years ago. We have selected these two participants because they gave long and rich interviews in which many of the narrative points voiced by other interviewees in our pilot, were made with particular clarity and elegance. Both Rebecca and Demetra are career women, aged in their 30s, and university-educated. The interviews took place in Athens in June 2007.
Counter-diasporic movements

In its original meaning ‘diaspora’ connotes the scattering of a population, caused by some forced or traumatic historical event (Cohen 1995). However, the semantics and etymology of the term are unclear about return to the diasporic origin. Evidence of return is fairly abundantly scattered in the literature on diasporas, but is not systematically conceptualised as a migratory flow. We introduce the notion of counter-diasporic migration to rectify this.

The semantic situation is complicated by the fact that diaspora has itself become a term of multiple and flexible meaning. Over the past decade, it has been energetically critiqued and unpacked by numerous authors (for instance Anthias 1998; Brubaker 2005; Mitchell 1997; Skeldon 2001). Currently the concept of diaspora stands in an uneasy and ambiguous relationship to ‘transnational community’ and few attempts have been made to analytically disentangle the two (Brah 1996: 178–210; van Hear 1998: 1–12). Indeed they are often conflated and juxtaposed in the same phrase or narrative. Tölölyan’s (1991: 5) memorable remark that contemporary diasporas are ‘the exemplary communities of the transnational moment’, quoted approvingly by both Brah (1996: 186) and Vertovec and Cohen (1999: xiii), illustrates how the term mixes with and overlaps the meanings of words like expatriate, refugee, migrancy, exile etc. to form ‘an unruly crowd of descriptive/interpretative terms’ that ‘jostle and converse’ in the modern lexicon of migration studies (Clifford 1994: 303).2 For Brubaker (2005) the meaning of diaspora has itself become scattered.

Debating diaspora

So let us start with the basics. In a seminal article, Safran (1991: 83–4) describes diasporas as ‘expatriate minority communities’ with six key defining characteristics:

- they, or their ancestors, were dispersed, most likely through persecution and genocide, from a specific original centre to two or more distant, foreign locations;
- they maintain a collective memory, which may be mythical, about their homeland;
- they believe that they are not – and probably cannot be – fully accepted by their host country, and therefore feel insulated and alienated from the host society;
- they see their ancestral home as their ‘authentic, pure’ home and as a place of eventual return – when conditions are right for this;
- they are committed to the maintenance and restoration of their homeland to conditions of safety and prosperity;
- the group’s consciousness and solidarity are importantly defined by their ongoing relationship to their homeland.

Safran sees the Jewish diaspora as the ‘ideal type’ and acknowledges several others as ‘legitimate’ in terms of all or most of the above criteria. These are the Armenian, Maghrebi, Palestinian, Cuban, Greek, Chinese and Polish diasporas. Whilst we are gratified to see the inclusion of Greece on this list in view of our current research, in other respects this seems an odd and incomplete selection.3

A somewhat different approach is taken by Cohen (1997) who widens the definition of diasporas to include other historical processes, producing a five-fold typology. These types, with typical examples, are victim diasporas (Jews, Armenians, slave diasporas), labour diasporas (Indian indentured labour, Italians and Filipinos), imperial/colonial diasporas (Ancient Greek, British, Portuguese), trade diasporas (Lebanese, Chinese) and cultural diasporas (Caribbean). These types are not mutually exclusive; indeed certain migrant peoples fit the characteristics of two or more diaspora types, either simultaneously or at different points in time. The Greek diasporas are a case in point, moving successively through imperial, trading and labour-migration phases. Diasporas are constantly under production, thus creating ‘new diasporas’, ‘incipient diasporas’ or ‘diasporas-in-the-making’ (van Hear 1998).

The danger with this progressive refinement and relaxation of the boundaries and meaning of diaspora is that it becomes coterminous with other established notions such as international migrants, ethnic minorities, transnational communities etc. – a danger that Cohen and Van Hear (and others) acknowledge. We, too, recognise this broadening of the multicausal historical processes and the myriad individual journeys and narratives that lead to diasporas being formed; on the whole we find it helpful in explaining the spread of diasporic consciousness amongst so many exiled peoples in the world, be they the result of ancient population movements, either forced or voluntary (often the distinction is blurred), or of contemporary economic and political processes such as labour migration or refugee expulsion.

What distinguishes the diasporic condition from contemporary international migration and transnational communities is historical continuity across at least two generations, a sense of the
possible permanence of exile and the broad spread and stability of the distribution of populations within the diaspora. In other words, 'time has to pass' before a migration becomes a diaspora (Cohen 1997: 185). This formulation, too, enables us to distinguish between straightforward return migration (of first-generation migrants) and counter-diasporic return, which only applies to second- or subsequent-generation migrants. Hence only a 'child of diaspora' can engage in the chronotope of counter-diasporic migration. The return, either as an individual event or as a sponsored movement, resolves the contradiction between the current situation in the diaspora and its imagined home and past (Cohen 1997: 185).

Debates on diasporas have taken on new vigour in recent years, building in particular on the important critique of Floya Anthias (1998), and on new ways of theorising the concept. Anthias argues that there are two dominant approaches to diaspora: a 'traditional' approach which considers diaspora as a descriptive-analytical category and which is mainly concerned with specifying criteria for inclusion (cf. Cohen 1997; Safran 1991); and a more 'post-modern' use of the term as a socio-cultural condition, associated with writers such as Brah (1996) and Hall (1990). To a large extent this distinction corresponds to the division proposed by Mavroudi (2007) into theorisations of diaspora as 'bounded' homeland-oriented ethnic groups and identities; or as 'unbound' fluid, non-essentialised, nomadic identities. Whilst there is undoubtedly heuristic value in the 'typologies of diaspora' approach (as we have already affirmed above), our approach in this paper and in our ongoing research in Greece and Cyprus is more in tune with the post-modern and post-structuralist reconceptualisations of diaspora. In particular we wish to guard against the danger of 'ethnic essentialism' in diaspora studies (one of Anthias's key criticisms), or its 'fetishisation' (cf. Samers 2003); we prefer to explore, instead, the notion of diaspora as exemplifying 'mutable allegiances and belongings, a recognition of hybridity, and the potential for creativity' (Ni Laoire 2003: 276). By focusing explicitly on the second-generation members of diaspora we can draw attention to the complex intersections between diasporic identities, geographic positionality, class, gender, age and generations. Not all these intersections will be analysed in detail in this paper, because of the preliminary nature of our empirical evidence at this point in time, but we set these out as an agenda to guide our ongoing research.

**Return to the homeland?**

The teleology of an eventual return to the homeland is variable between diasporas, across time, and of course amongst individuals. Van Hear (1998: 6) notes that, if diasporic formation has accelerated in recent time, so too has the 'unmaking of diasporas, seen in the regrouping or in-gathering of migrant communities...' (emphasis in original). Examples include the 'return' of ethnic Germans to unified Germany from the USSR, Poland and Romania after 1989, the large-scale influx of Russian Jews to Israel in the 1990s, and the 'return' of the Pontic Greeks from various parts of the USSR, also in the 1990s. As indicated, in one sense 'return' is a misnomer, for many of these populations have not seen their 'homeland' for generations or centuries; indeed they may not speak its language.

'Ancestral return' is part of the recognised typology of return migration (King 1978) but in these classifications it is usually mentioned only in passing, and dismissed as 'the return that is not return' or as a 'marginal form of return' (Bovenkerk 1974: 19; King 1986: 6–7). This is where our notion of counter-diasporic migration steps in to fill the conceptual void. But is the 'desire for return' a necessary criterion for the specification of a diaspora, as Safran's list indicates? Not always, as Safran himself points out (1991: 367–71). African Americans, products of the slave diaspora, do have a 'homeland myth' but it can no longer be precisely focused and only a tiny minority have actually returned to Africa. The Parsees, mainly resident in the Mumbai region of India, have no myth of return to their original homeland, Iran, which they left in the eighth century. The Gypsies or Roma are a special case (Safran calls them a 'metadiaspora') because their place of origin has no clear geographical identity and because their nomadic diasporisation is an expression or idealisation of their existential condition (Safran 1991: 368). Even for the Jewish diaspora, the classic or ideal type, return is problematic and variable as a condition for their diasporic identity. For many members of this diaspora, their Jewish identity is expressed in the diaspora and a 'return' to Israel is never contemplated, for either practical or theological reasons. Clifford (1994: 305, 321) notes that, for them, the lateral axes of diaspora may be more important than a strong attachment to and desire for a literal return to the homeland. According to Safran (1991: 369), third-generation Jews in the US look back not to Israel but to the East European *shtetl* of their grandparents.

Homeland orientation and a universal desire to return are thus questionable as necessary criteria for the definition of diaspora, especially for
long-established diasporas dating back centuries. For newer diasporas, those which are the result of labour migrations or refugee flows over the past half-century or so, the more specific phenomenon of second-generation ‘return’ does seem to be gaining in significance. Evidence for this comes from two main geographical regions: the Caribbean and Southern Europe, major migration reservoirs for postwar labour migration to Britain and Europe respectively. The South European case draws mainly on recent research by Christou on returning Greek-Americans (Christou 2006a; 2006b; 2006c; 2006d; Christou and King 2006; Panagakos 2004) and by Wessendorf (2007) on secondos, second-generation Italians in Switzerland. The Caribbean case is more broadly based in an extensive literature on Caribbean multi-generational transnationalism (see, for instance, Byron 1994; Chamberlain 1997; 1998; Gmelch 1992; Goulbourne 2002; Goulbourne and Chamberlain 2001; Pessar 1997), but has recently been spearheaded by important research by Potter and Phillips on second-generation return (see Phillips and Potter 2005; Potter 2005a; 2005b; 2005c; Potter and Phillips 2006a; 2006b). These two geographically-defined bodies of literature are by no means the only settings for counter-diasporic return, and further evidence from other parts of the world will be referenced when we examine key features of the cultural geography of second-generation return in the last part of our paper.

Defining, studying and theorising the second generation

Usage of the term ‘second generation’ poses challenges both as a descriptive notion and as an analytic category. Researchers and others are rather free with their use of the term to connote a specific collective of people, but their definitions are blurred and often inadequate. In focusing on this rather intriguing term, we first note the variable definitions used to circumscribe this population cohort, as well as the multiple understandings of the more general term ‘generations’. We then go on to stress how the conceptualisation of the second generation is nearly always with reference to its expected trajectory of assimilation into the host society. Finally we examine the transnational links of the second generation and some of their connections to their parents’ country of origin.

Variable definitions

There are important definitional questions surrounding the second generation, which are likely to affect the outcomes and the interpretations of research. The strict or ‘classic’ definition of the second generation is that it is made up of children born in the host country to two immigrant parents, the latter being the first generation. Complications set in when we begin to relax this definition. What about children with one immigrant parent? How do we view children brought to a host country when they are very small? Regarding the latter, census and population-register statistics record them as foreign-born, and therefore first-generation immigrants, but sociologically they are practically indistinguishable from the narrow definition of second generation.

In the enormous literature on international migration, settlement, integration and assimilation, a range of operational definitions of the second generation has been used, usually without much, if any, discussion. Moreover these definitional problems are not new. Irvin Child's classic study of second-generation Italians in the United States refers to ‘the offspring of immigrants, either born here or brought from the mother country at an early age’ (1943: 3). The immediate question is: how early is early-age? Fifty years on, in a study which, as we shall see presently, has some parallels to Child's, Portes and Zhou (1993: 75) gave one of a number of possible answers: ‘native-born children with at least one foreign-born parent, or children born abroad who came to the United States before the age of 12’.

Examples of arbitrary, variable and overlapping thresholds for second-generation categorisation can be multiplied. We do not want to huff and puff too much over this, but here are a few. Louie (2006), whose research focuses on the second-generation Chinese and Dominicans in the US, more or less follows the Portes and Zhou definition: she specifies the second generation as US-born children of (presumably two) immigrant parents and foreign-born children who immigrated by the age of 12, and who were thus largely educated and socialised in the United States. Yet Ellis and Goodwin-White (2006) define as ‘1.5 generation’ those who arrive in the US under 10 years of age. Thus an 11-year-old arrival is classed second-generation by Louie and as first generation by Ellis and Goodwin-White. Ellis and Zhou (1993: 75) gave one of a number of possible answers: ‘native-born children with at least one foreign-born parent, or children born abroad who came to the United States before the age of 12’.

Examples of arbitrary, variable and overlapping thresholds for second-generation categorisation can be multiplied. We do not want to huff and puff too much over this, but here are a few. Louie (2006), whose research focuses on the second-generation Chinese and Dominicans in the US, more or less follows the Portes and Zhou definition: she specifies the second generation as US-born children of (presumably two) immigrant parents and foreign-born children who immigrated by the age of 12, and who were thus largely educated and socialised in the United States. Yet Ellis and Goodwin-White (2006) define as ‘1.5 generation’ those who arrive in the US under 10 years of age. Thus an 11-year-old arrival is classed second-generation by Louie and as first generation by Ellis and Goodwin-White. Ellis and Zhou (1993: 75) gave one of a number of possible answers: ‘native-born children with at least one foreign-born parent, or children born abroad who came to the United States before the age of 12’.

Examples of arbitrary, variable and overlapping thresholds for second-generation categorisation can be multiplied. We do not want to huff and puff too much over this, but here are a few. Louie (2006), whose research focuses on the second-generation Chinese and Dominicans in the US, more or less follows the Portes and Zhou definition: she specifies the second generation as US-born children of (presumably two) immigrant parents and foreign-born children who immigrated by the age of 12, and who were thus largely educated and socialised in the United States. Yet Ellis and Goodwin-White (2006) define as ‘1.5 generation’ those who arrive in the US under 10 years of age. Thus an 11-year-old arrival is classed second-generation by Louie and as first generation by Ellis and Goodwin-White. Ellis and Zhou (1993: 75) gave one of a number of possible answers: ‘native-born children with at least one foreign-born parent, or children born abroad who came to the United States before the age of 12’.

Examples of arbitrary, variable and overlapping thresholds for second-generation categorisation can be multiplied. We do not want to huff and puff too much over this, but here are a few. Louie (2006), whose research focuses on the second-generation Chinese and Dominicans in the US, more or less follows the Portes and Zhou definition: she specifies the second generation as US-born children of (presumably two) immigrant parents and foreign-born children who immigrated by the age of 12, and who were thus largely educated and socialised in the United States. Yet Ellis and Goodwin-White (2006) define as ‘1.5 generation’ those who arrive in the US under 10 years of age. Thus an 11-year-old arrival is classed second-generation by Louie and as first generation by Ellis and Goodwin-White. Ellis and Zhou (1993: 75) gave one of a number of possible answers: ‘native-born children with at least one foreign-born parent, or children born abroad who came to the United States before the age of 12’.

Examples of arbitrary, variable and overlapping thresholds for second-generation categorisation can be multiplied. We do not want to huff and puff too much over this, but here are a few. Louie (2006), whose research focuses on the second-generation Chinese and Dominicans in the US, more or less follows the Portes and Zhou definition: she specifies the second generation as US-born children of (presumably two) immigrant parents and foreign-born children who immigrated by the age of 12, and who were thus largely educated and socialised in the United States. Yet Ellis and Goodwin-White (2006) define as ‘1.5 generation’ those who arrive in the US under 10 years of age. Thus an 11-year-old arrival is classed second-generation by Louie and as first generation by Ellis and Goodwin-White. Ellis and Zhou (1993: 75) gave one of a number of possible answers: ‘native-born children with at least one foreign-born parent, or children born abroad who came to the United States before the age of 12’.

Examples of arbitrary, variable and overlapping thresholds for second-generation categorisation can be multiplied. We do not want to huff and puff too much over this, but here are a few. Louie (2006), whose research focuses on the second-generation Chinese and Dominicans in the US, more or less follows the Portes and Zhou definition: she specifies the second generation as US-born children of (presumably two) immigrant parents and foreign-born children who immigrated by the age of 12, and who were thus largely educated and socialised in the United States. Yet Ellis and Goodwin-White (2006) define as ‘1.5 generation’ those who arrive in the US under 10 years of age. Thus an 11-year-old arrival is classed second-generation by Louie and as first generation by Ellis and Goodwin-White. Ellis and Zhou (1993: 75) gave one of a number of possible answers: ‘native-born children with at least one foreign-born parent, or children born abroad who came to the United States before the age of 12’.
Britain, uses ‘the second generation’ to include those who arrived in Britain up to the age of 15. Meanwhile, in her study of African-Italians in Italy, Andall (2002) defines the second generation as those born in Italy or who arrived before the age of 6. Of course, any cut-off point is arbitrary, but Andall’s approach, and that of Crul and Vermue, seems most sensible, since it corresponds to the school starting age: Modood’s extension to 15 seems problematic in this regard.

Another approach is a more graduated one: the ‘true’ second generation (host-country-born with two foreign-born parents); and then the 1.75, 1.5 and 1.25 generations, referring respectively to foreign-born children arriving before 6, between 6 and 12, and after 12 and up to 17 years of age (Rumbaut 1997). Others proffer less numerically precise definitions: the ‘post-immigrant generation’ (Rumbaut 2002) or ‘post-migrant generation’ (Wessendorf 2007).

The ‘G word’

There is also a wider debate about the usefulness of the very notion of ‘generation’ as a demographic and sociological concept (Eckstein 2002; Kertzer 1983; Loizos 2007). In deconstructing the biological definition, defined by position within the migrating or ‘post-migration’ family, Eckstein argues instead for a more historical reconceptualisation, distinguishing between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ generations of immigrants in the United States. For her, the differences in these historical immigration phases are overriding. Hence both the first and second (biological) generations of the earlier (historical) generations of immigrants have been affected by similar integration circumstances, similar home-country backgrounds in Europe, and similar global conditions. The same principle holds for the ‘new’ generation of immigrants: assimilation trajectories, economic opportunities and experiences of transnationalism for both first and second (biological) generations reflect specific new historical conditions that have fundamentally changed since the 1960s (Eckstein 2002: 213).5

Eckstein’s point has another application, namely that ‘second-generation returnees’ will be different according to which historical period and emigrant destination (i.e. chronotope) they are located within. We might therefore expect that second-generationers relocating to Greece from the US – where they have a long history of settlement and an economic profile of small business-owners – might have different settlement experiences in their parental homeland than those relocating from Germany, where the original emigration is more recent, more concentrated in time (1960s and early 1970s), and mainly involved industrial labour migrants (Fakiolas and King 1996). We shall return to this hypothesis in the final section of the paper.

Eckstein’s historical separation into earlier and later generations of immigrants is just one of the multiple meanings of generation, ‘guaranteed to sow confusion’ (Kertzer 1983: 142). For Loizos (2007: 194), the ‘G word’ is too seductive; a ‘rhetorical trope’ which tells us rather less than it should. Fundamentally fickle in its polysemy, generation is ‘unsafe’ in serious empirical research unless its precise meaning is specified in advance. Kertzer (1983) identifies four meanings:

- generation as a principle of kinship descent: here it is a relational, genealogical concept used to define patterns within the larger universe of kinship;
- generation as life-stage, often referring to a particular life-course segment (infancy, childhood, adolescence, adulthood, middle age, elderly etc.) or to more generalised contrasts (younger generation, older generation, college generation etc.) where there may or may not be a genealogical relation such as parent–child;
- generation as cohort: a set of similar-age people moving through the life-course, for instance based on a birth cohort;
- generation as historical period: the meaning used by Eckstein above, where generation is linked to some historical event or to people living/moving in a particular historical period.

Each of these meanings is widespread in social science literature, although each has tended to be associated with a particular discipline – respectively with anthropology, sociology, demography and history. Moreover, although analytically distinct, some of these meanings overlap (the first and second, for instance) and have sometimes, mistakenly, been used interchangeably. For example, Kertzer takes to task the well-known work of Cribier (1981) on the retirement behaviour of Parisians, which slips between genealogical and cohort meanings.6 In everyday discourse, generation is frequently used when we speak of the ‘older generation’, the ‘generation gap’, ‘generational conflict’ etc. – without, however, specifying which definition we are employing.

Turning to migration studies, the well-known concept of immigrant generations (usually first, second and third), conventionally used to measure the progressive loss of ethno-cultural distinctiveness en route to assimilation, is much more problematic than most scholars have
acknowledged. Following again Kertzer (1983), we identify the following problems:

- People sharing the same genealogical and generational position may belong to different historical periods, coming from an origin society and arriving in a destination society which will have both changed over time.

- Parents often migrate with their children, and in some cases even three generations move together. Are both parents and children to be considered first-generation? The concept of ‘fractional’ generations (1.5 generation etc.) resolves this question to some extent, but we are still left with an anomaly of how to ‘define’ the grandparents, who may either migrate with their first-generation children or join them at a later date.

- As we move beyond the first generation in the host country, subsequent marriages are not necessarily generation-homogenous nor ethnically endogenous. It is quite common (for various reasons) for the second generation to seek spouses from the ‘home’ country. Any children thus have one second- and one first-generation parent – in which case they could be labelled 2.5 generation, although this term has little currency (but see Rumbaut 2004: 1185). These problems undoubtedly complicate the environment for research on the second generation, even more so when we come to consider second-generation ‘return’; but in a sense they also enrich the field, alerting us to the complexity of reality and to the fundamental difficulty of categorising populations.

**Is assimilation inevitable?**

Child’s (1943) study of the second-generation Italian-Americans showed them faced by a dilemma: should they rush to assimilate but risk being rejected by the majority (white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant) society for their ‘difference’ and at the same time lose their Italian ethnic identities through ‘disloyalty’; or should they confirm their Italianness and jeopardise their chances of improving their material and social conditions? Child found many unable to choose, resulting in a third outcome, apathy.

In some ways Child anticipated the important discussion on ‘segmented assimilation’ of the ‘new’ second generation in the US launched by Portes and Zhou in 1993. The new second generation were the offspring of the largely non-European nationals who dominated the immigration geography of the post-1965 period, most of whom came from Latin America, the Caribbean, China, Korea and India (Portes 1996). Segmented assimilation described three alternative paths that might be followed by these new second-generationists: assimilation into ‘mainstream’ US (white) society; assimilation into the ‘native underclass’ of poor-quality jobs, poverty and unemployment; or staying within the ethnic group and achieving a measure of social progress (eg. within the ‘ethnic economy’) in this way.

The model of segmented assimilation is but one element in a whole range of second-generation-focused assimilation studies carried out in the US over the past decade or so. Four stand out:

- The Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study (CILS) was conducted with large samples of second-generation children attending 8th and 9th grades in schools in Miami, Florida, and San Diego, California. Results of the CILS have been published in many articles and two key books: *Legacies: The Story of the Immigrant Second Generation* (Rumbaut and Portes 2001), which describes the study’s methodology and principal findings and which is the main empirical demonstration of the theory of segmented assimilation; and *Ethnicities: Children of Immigrants in America* (Portes and Rumbaut 2001), which presents detailed case studies of the main immigrant groups represented in the sample. Portes and Rumbaut (2005) overview and update this research in a more recent paper.

- The Second Generation in Metropolitan New York Project focuses on adults aged 18–32 who are either native-born (‘whites’, African Americans and Puerto Ricans) or second-generation (Dominicans, West Indians, Chinese, Russian Jews, Colombians, Ecuadorians and Peruvians). The project has evolved over three stages: telephone surveys, in-depth interviews and ethnographic field projects. Although the project does not completely overlook links to the parental home, the assimilationist philosophy is evident in the title of the main book of the project, *Becoming New Yorkers* (Kasinitz et al. 2004).

- The Immigrant and Intergenerational Mobility in Metropolitan Los Angeles (IIMMLA) study focuses on second-generation immigrants in LA in their young adult years (22–39). It complements the New York project by examining the metropolitan area containing the largest Mexican-origin population in the US, although other nationalities are compared as well in order to differentiate assimilation strategies across groups (Bean and Stevens 2003; Brown 2007; Rumbaut et al. 2006).

- Finally, the Longitudinal Immigrant Student Adaptation (LISA) study, part of the Harvard Immigration Project, has a narrower remit,
focusing on foreign-born children and their experiences, especially in school. Employing a mixed methodology of surveys and ethnography, the research focuses especially on psycho-social and identity issues. The children are from Mexico, Central America, Dominican Republic, Haiti and China (Suárez-Orozco and Suárez-Orozco 2001) and the research carried out in schools in Boston and San Francisco.

These studies – and many others, mostly smaller-scale but also including large number-crunching census analyses (eg. Rumbaut 2004) – form the raw material for a lively debate about assimilation across generations of migrants to the US. Three main comparative axes frame this debate: the historical comparison between old (European) and new (non-European) immigrants; the comparison across biological generations (first, second, third, and fractions in-between); and the variable assimilation trajectories among the different nationality groups of the recent immigrants. The details and nuances of these debates lie outwith the scope of this review, but some key elements can be mentioned as they are relevant to our discussion in this paper.

Classical or straight-line assimilation (eg. Gordon 1964), which assumed a steady assimilation into the American mainstream by the third generation, was stood on its head by Gans (1992) who presented the notion of ‘second-generation decline’, namely that the ‘new’ second generation would fall short of the achievements of their immigrant parents. Segmented assimilation (Portes and Zhou 1993; Rumbaut and Portes 2001) was a further revisionist challenge to classical assimilation theory. Theories of second-generation decline and segmented assimilation argue that the experiences of twenty-first-century ‘immigrant children’ will be quite different from their late-nineteenth and early- and mid-twentieth-century counterparts from Italy, Poland or Greece, some of whom have outperformed their native white American peers.

Subsequently there has been a re-evaluation of the concept of assimilation, now cast in a broader definitional frame and also encompassing some European perspectives (Alba 2005; Alba and Nee 1997; Brubaker 2001). This reappraisal emphasises the agency of social actors in negotiating the incorporation process and views assimilation as an interactive, bumpy journey along multiple pathways – cultural, linguistic, socio-economic etc. The canonical study in the rehabilitation of assimilation has been Alba and Nee’s (2003) instantly noteworthy book Remaking the American Mainstream. Alba and Nee reassert the theoretical value of assimilation as integration into some unified core of common values, practices and language with concomitant erosion of ethnic, social and cultural differences, and generally favour a more optimistic scenario for America’s new second generation.

The pessimistic scenario of second-generation decline and incorporation into an urban underclass of unemployment and poverty has also been challenged by Waldinger and his co-authors (Perlmann and Waldinger 1997; Waldinger and Feliciano 2004; Waldinger and Perlmann 1998; Waldinger et al. 2007). This line of reasoning first questions the ‘seamless integration’ of the older (historical) generations of European immigrants to the US, and second argues that, over time, the new immigrants will progress. Waldinger et al. (2007) point out, for example, that there are substantial parallels in the experiences of today’s Mexican Americans (the archetypal ‘new’ immigrant group) and the Southern Europeans of the earlier immigration epoch.

But there are two generalisations that one must draw from the now-vast field of American assimilation literature. First there is a persistent blind-spot over the national context – so much of the immigrants themselves, but of the host society (Thomson and Crul 2007). Second, the ‘transnational’, ‘diasporic’ and ‘return’ perspectives have been overlooked. Both these critiques derive from the self-identity of the US as a large country ‘made’ by immigrants who become, eventually, ‘Americans’. Any comparative perspective – even with nearby Canada – is generally ignored; and the perception of immigration as a one-way-street reflects what King (2000: 28–33) has called the ‘myth of non-return’ in American immigration history.

To some extent, these two critical omissions are picked up in recent research on immigrants in Europe, where ‘integration’ is the favoured (but still problematic) term. The comparative context embraces studies both of different source countries and different destination states. Two cross-national studies are notable here:

- The EFFNATIS project, on the ‘Effectiveness of National Integration Strategies’ towards second-generation youth, collected comparative data from eight European countries during 1998–2000 (EFFNATIS 2001). Field surveys were carried out in France, Germany and England using a common questionnaire, whilst country studies, based on existing secondary data, were drawn up for Sweden, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Spain. But the comparative value of the project was limited because of the dual methodology and the fact that different ethnic groups were studied.
• The TIES project, on ‘The Integration of the European Second Generation’, examines, more systematically than EFFNATIS, the ‘integration performance’ (mainly education and employment outcomes) of the Turkish, Moroccan and former Yugoslav second generation in eight countries – Belgium, the Netherlands, France, Germany, Switzerland, Austria, Sweden and Spain – based on a common set of questionnaires. Allied ethnographic research extends the geographical scope of the TIES network (see Crul 2007; Crul and Vermeulen 2003b)

Nevertheless, like their US counterparts, these projects are still based on an uncompromisingly one-track orientation to the host society and therefore to a hegemonic understanding of ‘integration’ into the structures, values and practices of the destination country’s economy, education system, and linguistic and socio-cultural spheres.

Transnational/diasporic links of the second generation

Another important strand of recent research – based mainly on ethnographic methods – explores more complex articulations of second-generation integration and identity, including hybrid modes of cultural identity that reflect both the country of settlement and the parents’ country of origin. Studies from as far apart as Boston, Massachusetts and Senegal (Leichtman 2005; Levitt 2001; 2002), as well as many other settings, find that immigrant transnationalism is not a phenomenon confined to the first generation, but one that can extend to the second and subsequent generations. Moreover, a rapid and successful integration/assimilation does not preclude the second generation from engaging in a range of transnational/diasporic activities linking them back to their ‘home’ country (Itzigsohn and Giorguli-Saucedo 2005). At the same time, the maintenance of a strong ethnic identity in the host society does not necessarily mean that the group has strong transnational ties to home – as some studies of diasporas, noted earlier, have shown. Indeed, it could be argued that the existence of a vibrant ethnic enclave which effectively reproduces most elements of the ‘home culture’ means that migrants do not need to visit their (parents’) home country (Vickerman 2002).

On the whole, however, it is remarkable how silent the now-burgeoning literature on migrant transnationalism is on the second generation.7 The major exception is the collection edited by Levitt and Waters (2002), which draws some material from the US-based research projects listed above (Kasinitz et al. 2002; Rumbaut 2002) as well as presenting case studies of a variety of immigrant groups in the US – including chapters on Japanese, Chinese, Korean, Filipino, Vietnamese and West Indian second-generation links to parental home countries. The links involve various kinds of communication – letters, emails, telephone calls, visits, remittances, property inheritance etc. – as well as participation in the more generalised transnational social spaces created and articulated by their parents’ lives and by ethnic or home-country media. Yet none of the studies in Levitt and Waters’ volume analyses the question of a more definitive ‘return’, once again reflecting the hubris of American immigration scholarship. Part of the reason for this is logistical: studies of second-generation return have to be based in the country of parental origin to which the migrants have relocated, and the chapters in Levitt and Waters are focused on US-based field and survey work. Nevertheless the case studies are fascinating for many reasons – the research methods used, the different historical contexts explored, and the contrasting results uncovered. For instance, Ueda (2002) examined 76 autobiographical ‘life-histories’ written by second-generation Japanese American high school students in Hawaii in 1926. The accounts revealed how these Nisei were pulled culturally in two directions – by ‘Americanisation’ and by their cultural heritage. Many students aspired to become ‘cultural interpreters’ between the two nations, and one wrote of her desire to ‘return’ to Japan to become a teacher there. By contrast, Foner’s (2002) retrospective analysis of Italian-American migration in the early twentieth century reveals few instances of transnational behaviour amongst the second generation, and none of actual return. On the other hand, amongst the ‘new’ second generation, she finds, alongside strong evidence of rapid assimilation, significant participation in transnational social fields – especially amongst West Indians, Dominicans and other Latinos. Foner also notes (2002: 247) the quite widespread practice amongst the latter groups for immigrant parents to send their school-age children back to live with their relatives, often grandparents. The reasons for this may be to avail of childcare, to expose the second generation to the cultural values of the home society, or – perhaps most importantly – to protect teenagers from the dangers of inner-city high schools and street-life (gangs, drugs, sexual precociousness etc.). This back-and-forth movement complicates the classifications of children as second generation, as does the situation (amongst Mexican migrants, for example) where children are shuttled to-and-fro across the border with parents who are seasonal migrants.
Later on in the life-course, first-generation retirement back to the home country may also reinforce the second generation’s ties: the (by now adult) second generation will make visits to see their parents, ensuring that the next (i.e. third) generation keep connected with their grandparents and their ancestral heritage. Financial and care duties may also be involved; the adult second generation may need to offer economic support, via remittances, as well as long-distance emotional support and emergency hands-on care during the last phase of their parents’ lives (Baldassar et al. 2007; Zontini 2007).

Visits ‘home’ by the younger-aged second generation can have various outcomes. Such homeland trips – which are usually motivated by tourism, seeing family and friends, and learning and (re-)discovering elements of the ancestral culture – may end up by simply reinforcing notions of how ‘American’ (or ‘British’ etc.) the second generation are, and convince them that their parents’ home country can never become their home (Kasinitz et al. 2002; Kibria 2002). For others, the return visit may be the precursor to a longer-term project of return (Christou 2006d). This more definitive return may or may not work out. Baldassar (2001) found that when visits home by second-generation Italian-Australians matured into a project for longer-term settlement, the experiment generally failed, and the migrants were back in Australia within six months or so.8 For yet others, the returns may subsequently evolve into an ongoing pattern of transnational living, constantly moving back and forth in order to sustain transnational business ventures, family relationships or cultural identity (Foner 2002: 250). Often, return trips are organised by the family, with second-generation members travelling back with their parents, but some homeland trips have become institutionalised around study-tour programmes – in the case of Korean and Chinese Americans, this very institutionalisation may reflect the lack of strong affective ties to the homeland (Kibria 2002: 298).

Another form of transnational linkage occurs when members of the second generation seek (or are pressured by their families to seek) spouses from the ‘home’ country. This usually ends up with the ‘recruited’ spouse migrating to the host society, but it can also be a mechanism by which the second-generation individual settles, upon marriage, in the ‘homeland’ (Christou 2006d). Beck-Gernsheim (2007), who has made a useful survey of transnational marriage practices amongst migrant communities in Europe, also shows how the second-generation holiday visit to the parental home can often be, in effect, a marriage-market exercise. This can frustrate and annoy the young visitor. Beck-Gernsheim (2007: 278) quotes the reaction of a young woman of Turkish origin: ‘You didn’t have a holiday, you were always visiting people... What they usually want is for me to marry there in Turkey and bring them over here [Germany]. That’s why they always came to see my parents’.

Of roots and replanting in homeland soil

A strong agricultural or gardening trope is evident in the semantics and discourse of diasporas (Cohen 1997: 177–8). From its Greek etymological origins of scattering or sowing over a wide area, diaspora members frequently talk of ‘roots’ and their ‘ancestral soil’, particularly in the context of return, as the quote at the head of this paper evocatively illustrates. More than most, diasporic individuals also talk of family trees, evidencing both a special awareness of kinship and the way the roots of the tree are anchored in one country with branches in several others. If diasporic journeys are essentially about exile, settling down, and putting roots ‘elsewhere’, the same applies to counter-diasporic migration, where the roots are replanted in the homeland soil. Wessendorf (2007) uses the term ‘roots migration’ to describe the ‘return’ settlement of second-generation Italians in Switzerland in their towns and villages in the south of Italy.

The ‘roots’ metaphor has powerful resonances in studies of tourism and visits to real or mythic diaspora homelands. Bruner (1996) has described African Americans’ visits to the slave ports of Ghana as a symbolic and mythical return of a diasporic people to their homeland; a kind of pilgrimage to a site viewed as both tragic and sacred. Many parallels exist elsewhere and, in countries such as Ireland, Scotland, Italy and Greece, ‘roots tourism’ has become an important and lucrative niche market within the tourism industry. For Basu (2004a; 2005), who did field research in the Scottish Highlands, ‘return to roots’ is both an actual physical movement, a performative act of belonging expressed through visits to ancestral and heritage locations; and a more generalised collective project of connection to the ‘homeland’.

Journeys to the land of the ancestors are made in order to articulate a sense of belonging to a historical community and to reaffirm or rediscover one’s ‘true’ identity. But the effects of such visits can vary profoundly. Two examples illustrate this, the first of which draws on Basu’s work cited above. Roots visits of North Americans of Scottish and Irish ancestry embody a reconnection between migration poles which are generations apart, yet there is no language barrier (except of dialect or accent). According to
Basu, typical roots visitors are senior citizens aged 55–75, ‘empty nesters’ travelling in couples. Such visits often follow internet-based genealogical research directed at identifying and then exploring the ancestral homeland: ‘closing the great circle of life’, to quote one of Basu’s interviewees (Basu 2004a: 151). Of course, the roots metaphor contains within its persuasive analogy the chance of becoming a self-certifying myth, more real than the empirical facts of migration, geography and genealogy. Roots tourists are often all-too-keen to tap into victimisation and survival narratives of Highland Clearances or Irish Famine which may have been – but most probably were not – relevant to their own particular ancestors’ transatlantic migration. These ‘foundational traumas’, which reflect a misappropriation of the paradigmatic Jewish Holocaust, are part of a jingoistic narrative of historical injustice, exile and search for a lost identity (Basu 2004a: 154, 161; 2005: 140–4). The search often focuses on ‘totemic sites’ of one’s heritage – the grave of an ancestor, a ruined croft, or some other ancestral or clan epigraph. To witness such a visit can be a moving experience. Basu (2004a: 150) describes a middle-aged Arizona couple on a quest to find his ancestors who were recorded as eighteenth-century millers in a small Scottish Highland township. They were taken around the now-deserted settlement, had their photograph taken by a large millstone built into a wall, and were shown the overgrown well that once served the township. Tears filled their eyes as they knelt to cup their hands to drink the still-clear water, and they filled their flasks with the spring water to take back to Arizona.

The second example involves a shorter space–time connection – the return visits made by young second-generation Koreans from Los Angeles and Boston (Kibria 2002). Whilst on the one hand the homeland trips fostered a sense of affinity – being surrounded by people ‘who looked the same as us’ – in other respects the visits challenged notions of ‘blood and belonging’ in profound ways. Kibria (2002: 305–6) describes how Jeff, a Korean American, had felt intensely emotional as he flew into Seoul, but time spent on the ground produced a series of disillusionments, due mainly to his inability to speak more than a few words of Korean. Jeff said he was made to feel stupid by the natives: ‘You’re Korean, but you can’t speak Korean’. Although he blended in at a physical level, in other respects he felt he ‘stuck out like a sore thumb’ because of language, dress and behaviour. Another of Kibria’s informants, Kyung Sook, ‘was traumatized by the language thing. Ever since that trip, I never think of myself as Korean. I’m of Korean descent, but not Korean’.

Clearly, Jeff and Kyung Sook are unlikely ever to go to live in Korea as their ‘homeland’.

Return migration

A key question which needs to be addressed when dealing with second-generation ‘return’ is the family context of this counter-diasporic migration: are second-generation ‘returnees’ acting independently (and thus perhaps leaving their parents behind in the host country); do they move as individuals or as (married) couples; are they moving to a partner in the ‘home’ country; are they moving as part of a multi-generation family return migration instigated by their parents; or are they moving, not with their parents, but perhaps to be closer to others, such as grandparents or cousins? Part of our interest in second-generation ‘return’ is the fact that, where it is an independent migration, it is not only counter-diasporic but also counter-intuitive, in that parental ties are sacrificed to a more generalised emotional link to the ‘homeland’. Of course, there may be special circumstances – the parents could have died, a family rift might have occurred, the individual might be seeking a fresh start after some personal crisis such as job loss or relationship breakdown. But the fact that independent second-generation migration to the parental homeland is taking place, as the evidence from the Caribbean and Greece cited earlier certainly indicates, suggests that there are broader questions of migratory causes, identity, homing and belonging which need to be explored. This we do in the subsequent, final section of the paper.

For now, we follow a different line of investigation and plough into another literature. The argument that second-generation resettlement in parental homelands can be better analysed in the context of (or in comparison with) first-generation return migration calls for a review of the general literature on return migration. There is now an established body of scholarship on this, although it is fragmented across many disciplines and migratory contexts. The origins of this literature are traceable at least to the late 1960s, and it flourished especially during the 1970s and 1980s when there was, indeed, a lot of return migration of the labour migrants of the early postwar period. In surveying this return literature, which includes earlier ‘classic’ studies (notably Theodore Saloutos’ 1956 study on returning Greek-Americans) as well as more recent literature on the continuing return of labour migrants, refugees, skilled migrants etc., we have two aims in mind. First, what does this literature say about the second generation? Second, what theoretical concepts, analytical frameworks and empirical generalisations from
the study of first-generation return can be fruitfully applied to the ‘return’ of the subsequent generation?

The first question is easy to answer: very little. The return literature concentrates almost exclusively on the first generation. This is as true of the early classic studies (e.g. Hernández Alvarez 1967; Saloutos 1956) as it is of the research on labour-migrant returns during the 1970s and 1980s (see, inter alia Baučić 1972; Bovenkerk 1974; Cerase 1974; Gmelch 1980; Kayser 1972; King 1979; 1986; 1988; Kubat 1984; Rhoades 1999) and of ongoing collections published in more recent years (Ghosh 2000; Harper 2005; Long and Oxfeld 2004; Markowitz and Stefansson 2004). It is true that, in these latest publications, one finds an emerging interest in ancestral return and other diaspora-homecomings (Basu 2005; Tsuda 2004), but almost none of this focuses on the specific experiences of the second generation. Meanwhile, from the earlier literature on labour migrants’ return, it is almost as if they had no families. What we find instead are fleeting references to the problems of the children of these returnees who are plunged into a school system with which they are unfamiliar, which is unprepared for them, and in which their educational progress may be seriously held back.9

The second question is more difficult to illustrate, for a number of reasons. First, return migration has remained rather under-theorised (Cassarino 2004; Rogers 1984; Tsuda 2004; Weist 1979). Although rich in typologies (Bovenkerk 1974; Gmelch 1980; King 1986), most attempts to theorise return involve its incorporation or application to general theories of migration, which say little or nothing about the second generation except in the context of integration/assimilation, as we have seen. This means that we can only fall back on an attempt to systematically and rigorously review frameworks and typologies of (first-generation) return to see if they can potentially say anything useful about the second generation’s parallel experiences.

Cassarino (2004) provides a useful template to enable us to do this. He recognises five theoretical paradigms for the study of return migration: neoclassical economics, the new economics of migration, structuralism, transnationalism, and cross-border social network theory. We build on this conceptual categorisation below, and incorporate specific, albeit speculative, connections to second-generation and counter-diasporic return.

Neoclassic and new economics of return

Neoclassical economics explains international migration as the product of real income differences between sending and destination countries; the migrant is depicted as a rational, income-maximising individual who decides to go abroad to access higher wages, having calculated the costs and benefits of doing so, including the probability of getting a job which materialises these expectations (Todaro 1969). Viewed in this optic, the returnee is a failed labour emigrant who miscalculated the costs and benefits or who failed to land a job (Cassarino 2004: 2–3).

The new economics of labour migration (NELM) approach broadens the context of economic analysis in two senses: it incorporates the individual within his/her family or household unit, and it blends income maximisation with risk aversion. NELM remains a rational-choice model, but it is a calculated strategy reflecting mutual interdependence and guaranteed survival (Stark 1991). In sharp contrast to the neoclassical stance, which sees return as failure, NELM views return as embodying successful achievement of the target set. The typical mechanism by which this success is attained involves one household member migrating abroad in order to generate remittances which are part and parcel of a strategy of income and resource diversification. Once the migrant has provided the household with the income and liquidity required, return takes place.

The second generation hardly figures in these two economic models. However, if we run the models to their next stage, whereby the migrant unit, including other members of the family, is now resident in the destination country, then we can see some relevance.

First, the economic calculus may change over time – such as during the course of a generation. The low-income, high-unemployment country of origin may become more developed, perhaps through industrialisation, the discovery of a natural resource, or tourism. These improved economic conditions may tempt back not only the first generation, but also the second. In making cost-benefit calculations, returnees and second-generationers will take into account not only headline wage but also cost-of-living and quality-of-life variables. Our project’s preliminary fieldwork on the ‘return’ of British-born Greek Cypriots reveals that economic considerations are often key. The Cypriot economy has transformed since the first generation emigrated during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s; no longer poor and rural, Cyprus has a high-growth economy based on a productive mix of industry, services and tourism which offers many possibilities to those who are ‘repatriating’, as well as drawing in immigrants...
from many other countries (King and Thomson 2008). Moreover, second-generationers relocating from the inflated property market of the UK, especially the London region, are able to enter the Cypriot housing market at a high level, and perhaps also use some of the liquefied assets to invest in a business.¹⁰

Second, the NELM approach may become relevant if the family retains links to both migration poles. If some family members remain in, or return to, the origin country – such as cousins or other relatives – then this provides a kinship context which many have economic implications too. To give a concrete example, Reynolds (2008) found that an important motive for the 'return' of British-born Jamaicans to Jamaica was the availability of older family members to supply childcare for their children, thus enabling both the parents to work.

A structural perspective
As is well-known, economic approaches to migration tend to detach (return) migrants from their social and political environments, overlooking both structural contexts and personal factors. Social, political and institutional factors, in both the migrants’ home countries and in their countries of settlement, deserve attention. Some of these structural factors may, indeed, be economic, such as the hypothetical situation of rising unemployment and falling standards of living in the migrants’ host country, and/or rising standards of living and improving economic conditions in their origin countries – as noted above. But these economic dynamics may also be connected to socio-political and policy changes. Government policies, such as repatriation or incentivised return, may hasten the return flow. Rising unemployment in host countries may lead to greater discrimination and racism directed at immigrants and their descendants, who are erroneously ‘blamed’ for the worsening employment situation. Reacting against this xenophobia, their thoughts turn to their ‘home’ country. Reynolds (2008) found that second-generation ethnic Caribbeans in Britain, who were never able to feel fully part of British society, tended to reorient themselves to their Caribbean parental home island, whose memory had been kept alive for them by their parents’ narratives and regular return visits.

Cassarino’s (2004: 4–7) account of the structural approach to return migration draws extensively on the work of Cerase (1974) in exploring both the reintegration pathways and the challenges faced by the returnee, and the potential impact returning migrants can have on the economic, social and cultural environment of the places they return to. Neither Cerase nor Cassarino draw out the full theoretical implications of this structuralist perspective on migration, integration, return and reintegration, which in truth exhibits a classic structure–agency dialectic. And neither do they draw any attention to the potential applicability of this framework to the second generation.

In Cerase’s model of first-generation return, the type of return he posits, and the impact this has on origin-country social and economic structures, are strictly related to the stage in the integration process the migrant has reached in the host country at the moment he or she decided to return. Although the model relies on a ‘linearist’ conception of integration, which has been heavily critiqued in more recent literature, as noted much earlier in our paper, we must remember the timing of Cerase’s research, and recognise its heuristic value. Drawing on field research on Italian migrants returning from the United States, Cerase specifies four kinds of return:

- **Return of failure** occurs when migrants fail to make any integration progress in the destination country. Perhaps they cannot get a job, are put off by discrimination against them, or make no headway in learning a new language. They feel rejected by their new host society, and so return home, where they make little developmental impact.

- **Return of conservatism** reflects the continued orientation to home-country values amongst migrants abroad. Despite achieving some economic success through hard work and careful saving and remitting, their thoughts are always directed at an eventual return. Their conservative social values mean that their main priorities upon return are to buy land, build a house and cater to their personal/family needs, so that they can enjoy social mobility within the social context of the place of origin; they thereby act to reinforce social structures, not to change them.

- **Return of retirement** is self-explanatory. Retirees return at the end of their working lives and so their developmental impact is minimal: their desire is to resettle comfortably in a nice house, maybe buy a plot of land and potter about on their ‘native soil’.

- **Return of innovation** is the ‘dynamic’ category in the typology. Based on their fairly advanced stage of integration achieved abroad, such returnees believe both that they themselves have changed, and that they have the capacity to effect change in their home societies, deploying the skills, capital and new ideas they have acquired abroad. Whether changes are stimulated by these
returnees is open to question. What often happens is a battle of wills between the innovation-minded returnees and the conservative power-brokers who still prevail in the host society – the old landowners, entrenched elites, etc. Undoubtedly there are instances where returnees are agents of change and development; but equally there are cases where their efforts are frustrated by vested interests.

Cerase’s typology taps into the ‘success or failure’ binary which is surely a too-simple question to pose about returning migrants, or about second-generation resatters. But there are aspects of the typology that can be extended to the next generation – although, once again, the various scenarios are speculative and need empirical testing. The relationship between ‘integration’ or ‘identification’ with the host society (in the case of the second generation, this is the society where they have spent all, or nearly all of their lives), and the propensity to migrate to the ‘homeland’, is one such dialectic. As noted above, second-generation individuals who do not feel fully integrated, for whatever reason (this could be a sense of marginalisation born of exclusion or discrimination, or produced by living in a strong ethnic community), are probably more likely to consider a homeland relocation. But this may reflect a too-simplistic reasoning: it may also be the case that successful integration and material comfort in the host society give the second-generation the luxury to think about expressing or discovering their identity in a different place: linkages and identifications with ‘host’ and ‘homeland’ societies are not positioned in a zero-sum game (Itzigsohn and Giorguli-Saucedo 2005). In other respects, the relationships between ‘home’ and ‘host’ countries can be reversed for second-generation ‘returnees’. The ‘return’ itself may be a failure, so that the ‘returnee’ then ‘returns’ to the country of birth and original residence. In this instance, the failure of the ‘return to the homeland’ project may well be due to some of the reasons mentioned above for Cerase’s ‘return of failure’ – failure to get satisfactory work, learn the language, or cope with different cultural practices.

The conservatism–innovation dynamic may play itself out in different ways when the second-generation migrants settle in the homeland. Such migrants may resettle there precisely because of a search for ‘traditional’ values and lifestyles, and be happy for that; or they may be shocked at the suffocating nature of what are discovered to be personalistic or even corrupt practices (for instance in securing a job, or obtaining planning permission for a home or business); or they may be able to benefit from the human and cultural capital they bring with them (education, languages, ‘modern’ outlook etc.) in order to advance their careers and social life.

In his review of the literature and theories on return migration, Cassarino (2004) stresses the relevance of contextual and situational factors, both in the areas where the migrants are returning from, but more especially in the countries they are returning to. This is even more relevant in the case of second-generation return, where, unlike first-generation returnees, the individuals involved have no experience of living long-term in the ‘homeland’, except perhaps as small children. Situational factors can only be evaluated a posteriori and therefore second-generation resatters in the homeland may be ill-prepared for the move due to the fact that they have not been able to gather sufficient information about the social, economic, cultural and political conditions which affect everyday life in the context of long-term residence and livelihood (Cassarino 2004: 5; Gmelch 1980: 143). The information that second-generation returnees possess prior to resettlement may be based on family narratives and short-term visits: both are likely to present a less-than-accurate portrayal of the homeland. Holiday visits generally reflect leisure, family fun, good weather and an idealised view of the ‘old country’; family narratives likewise may be outdated or idealistic.

A final structural point concerns the issue of precisely where the second generation settles in the homeland. Most postwar labour migration to North-West Europe, North America and Australia took place from rural areas in the various countries of origin; often these were villages in the poorest regions, hence the need to emigrate in the first place. For the sons and daughters of these original migrants, such marginalised rural contexts offer unpropitious settings for a sustainable ‘return’. Thus, to be viable, the ‘homeland’ return for most can only be effected via settlement in a larger town or city – such as Athens or Nicosia in the context of our research.

Transnationalism and social networks

Given its rise to prominence in the last decade and a half, transnationalism intrudes inevitably into any debate about international migration and diaspora nowadays: the ‘transnational turn’ is inescapable (Bailey 2001). Self-evidently, transnationalism represents an attempt to formulate a conceptual framework for understanding the ties – social, economic, cultural, political – between migrants’ host and origin countries. Such activities are expressed, according to Portes et al. (1999: 219), by ‘regular and sustained contacts over time across national
borders’. Viewed through the transnational lens, return migration is part and parcel of a system of ties and forms of mobility, but seen as an ongoing circuit rather than a definitive act of resettlement (Cassarino 2004: 7). On the other hand it can also be claimed – although this is hardly ever acknowledged in the literature on transnationalism – that pre-1990s studies of return migration were a prototype of the transnational approach.

It was pointed out earlier how transnational studies rarely focus on the specific experiences of the second generation. This, for sure, is an oversight, which our own research seeks to rectify. Following Cassarino (2004: 8–12), we suggest three lines of transnational thinking which can illuminate return migration, including second-generation relocation. These are transnational mobility, transnational identity, and transnational social networks. Of course, all are interconnected.

Transnational mobility embraces a range of movements, physical, symbolic and virtual, which keep the migrant in touch with the place of origin and contribute to the creation of a ‘transnational social space’ which comprises both ‘hostland’ and ‘homeland’ (Faist 2000; Fortier 2000). Frequent return visits are the most tangible expression of this. For many migrant groups, return visits are regular, frequent events throughout their emigrant lives. Initiated by the first generation, the second generation gets taken along too, often from an early age, so that they become keenly aware of the ‘other place’ in their family biography. Rebecca, second-generation Greek-German, was asked about her early vacation visits to Greece:

Every year, every year. Every summer vacation, six to eight weeks, by car. Actually, it’s a traditional Greek-German vacation – by car – so you can carry all the things you want to carry. This is the nightmare of everybody, three days in a car with all that stuff... It’s to bring gifts to the family... it’s also to bring Greek stuff back to Germany – it’s like litres of olive oil, of wine, and cheese and God knows what... that you cannot bring on a plane... I remember, like, in the beginning (laughs) it was vacuum cleaners and televisions... I mean, that has changed now because everything is available [in Greece]... but there was a time when everything that had a German name was better... So you were carrying all that stuff back and you were putting all the Greek stuff in the car and bringing it... (interview, Athens, June 2007).

Rebecca’s childhood reflections focused on the annual ritual (‘unload and reload’) of transferring what was ‘good’ from Germany (high-quality manufactured goods) and what was ‘genuine’ from Greece (food, wine, oil, products of the ‘Greek soil’), and the tedium of the three-day car journey.

Demetra, second-generation Greek-American, also reminisced on the importance of these childhood visits:

... we saved our money, every penny, for the summer vacation. Summer vacation was the biggest holiday and since my parents were economic migrants they saved every penny... to come back and see their homeland... it was engraved on me since I was 18 months old and my first trip... and since then it was back and forth, if not every year, every other year... We would come to Athens for maybe a week, maximum two weeks, and stay with my aunt, and then we would go to the village [her mother’s village of origin]... or my dad’s island, Cephalonia, and spend time by the beach... it felt like my big playground... I love those beaches even now... Was I getting close to my roots? Of course, because I would see my grandparents and the way they lived... but it wasn’t until I moved here that I really got into understanding that I was getting close to my roots (interview, Athens, June 2007).

Demetra’s memories of these early homeland visits are also reminiscences of the evolution of her own (and her family’s) transnational/diasporic kinship space, with links to Athens (her aunt) and the respective ‘home places’ of her parents, one of them an island. As a child, the beaches held particular appeal – ‘like a big playground’ – and they remain important in her current activity space in Greece. Kinship links – especially those which are kept alive by regular visits and other forms of contact – are often important in structuring the ‘return project’ (Christou 2006d) of the second-generationer.

In social network terms, return takes place when sufficient transnational resources (linkages, knowledge etc.) have been accumulated to facilitate the move, to make it a feasible and not-too-risky option (Cassarino 2004: 10–11). Various kinds of human, social and cultural capital may be involved; and these will tend to vary by the social
class and educational background of the ‘returnee’. For those with less education and hence fewer career options, kinship ties may be the most important. For the higher-skilled, possession of the right qualifications and knowledge of the labour market and hiring practices may be the key resources needed. Even then, personal ‘connections’ may be vital to getting a job, as many of our second-generation Greek informants confirmed.

On the face of it, possession of a strong transnational or diasporic identity is a sine qua non for second-generation migration to the ‘homeland’. How this identity is felt and expressed – and acted out – can vary, however. For some it will be an overwhelming sense of (for example) ethno-cultural Greekness derived from being part of the Greek diaspora. For others it will be manifested in the form of a ‘pull’ back to the parental homeland. For yet others, it will take the form of a dual or perhaps hybrid identity drawn from both the host society and the ethnic-origin society. Such double identities may be in conflict or in complementary harmony with each other; or, more likely, there may be elements of both of these indentificatory relationships, depending on situation and context. We provide more evidence on this in the next, and final, section of our paper.

**Where is home and where do I belong?**

Amongst the second generation, the search for ‘belonging’ and ‘home’ is often an extremely powerful, emotional, and even life-changing experience: an enactment of family heritage across time and space. For second-generation Greek-Americans (less so Greek-Germans), it is also a search for ontological security from a world which is otherwise confusing or perceived as moving too fast or in the wrong direction (cf. Christou and King 2006). For Greek-Germans the drive to relocate to Greece has more to do with the fact that they never felt they ‘belonged’ to German society, which has traditionally sanctified German ‘blood’ and marginalised foreigners, even those born in Germany, as ‘guestworkers’.

As an illustration, Rebecca described how, especially as a child in Germany, she felt – or was made to feel – part of a minority:

I felt different, I felt treated as different and this is something that I’ve carried throughout my life – being different... For a kid little things are extremely important, like when people at school or kindergarten would look at you and say ‘what kind of name is that?’... It’s also food... anything they were telling me they’d cook at home which is normal for other kids wasn’t for me, and what I was eating wasn’t for them. That’s a kind of difference.

Later in the interview Rebecca described how, after spending part of her early career as a consultant working in different places abroad, as well as teaching and freelancing in different countries, she felt she couldn’t resettle in Germany:

Germany is not my thing at all... I quit my job [for an American company]... it was tiring travelling and living in hotels, stuff like that... and went back to Germany. That was... the worst cultural shock, I couldn’t cope with it at all. And that was really unexpected because this is the place... you grew up in, you were born there, and now you cannot handle it! What’s wrong with you? And after all that, in 2004, I decided, this is it, you’re going to try to put your foot down in Greece...

In this sense the homeland return of the second generation is seen not so much as part of the new map of global mobility, with its diversifying rhythms and motivations, but rather as an act of resistance against hypermobility and dislocation (King 2002). Thus we see how different mobility regimes are substitutable. The
new East European shuttle migrants move to and fro to richer West European countries, gathering work opportunities on short-term contracts, precisely because they want to conserve their Polish, Slovakian or Ukrainian roots and not migrate for good. Second-generation returnees may do the opposite, seeking a final resting-place against their existential anxiety about their in-betweenness and where they belong. As several of our interviewees would relate, ‘I am finally home, where I belong... the cycle is closed’. In other words, the exile’s return is fuelled by nostalgia for the imagined stability and coherence of past times and places: the plan is to relocate the dislocated self somehow in an earlier, more authentic, time and place.

Demetra had recently bought a little house by the sea outside Athens: her description of it, right at the end of the interview, reflected on her life as a journey which – possibly – might be coming to a settled end, or might equally continue on to new places. Interestingly, she projects her own settled end, or might equally continue on to new places. Interestingly, she projects her own uncertainty about her migratory trajectory onto her boxes of clothes.

It’s just weird to see my boxes here... you know, boxes full of clothes that, you know, keep getting packed and unpacked... I wonder if the boxes are ever going to have a home. I wonder if these clothes are ever going to have a home... This place, I’ll never sell this place. Because it’s by the beach... I’ll never sell it... it’s a great investment, right? If I ever have kids, or now that my brother [who lives in California] is having kids, it can go to his kids. So...life is a journey... and it’s about going through this journey, you know, going through the ride of the roller-coaster. Sometimes I think it’s, you know, a nice cruise in a convertible, sometimes it’s like riding the waves and you have to be careful of that wave crashing on you... so life is a journey... and you never know, you know, what the next day is going to bring... I think unpredictability is what keeps us alive. Yeah. We can end on that note!

Rebecca was asked about the ‘when and why’ of her decision to come to Greece:

It’s difficult to say exactly but I would say that it was about three years ago. As I’ve said, I’d been working all over the place and also ignored the fact that I have Greek roots... and then it was an identity crisis of, like, ‘Who are you?’. This is when I started to discover that it’s to do with – not where I’m coming from, not where I was born – but with my ancestors.

The second generation’s ‘return’ is a profound homecoming at multiple levels. For sure, it can be understood as an existential journey to the source of the self, as a return to the ‘cradle’ of a partially-lost collective identity, as the diaspora’s cathartic mission to reclaim its sacred sites and to re-enter its mythic space and time; but it can also be simply the discovery of that place where one feels one most belongs (Basu 2004a: 161), a search for ‘grounded attachment’ (Blunt 2007: 687).

Amongst people living in diaspora, conceptualisations of home are almost inevitably multi-sited. According to Blunt and Dowling (2006: 199), the lived experiences and spatial imaginaries of diasporic people often revolve around complex dialogues about home – ‘the relationships between home and homeland, the existence of multiple homes, diverse home-making practices, and the intersections of home, memory, identity and belonging’. In this respect, the transnational homing experiences of migrants see the home simultaneously as both a ‘material and immaterial, lived and imagined, localised and (trans)national space of belonging’ that makes explicit the multiplicity and fluidity of home (Walsh 2006: 123).

Let us take a specific example: the case of a London-born British Greek Cypriot currently studying at university in another part of the country. Every afternoon, after attending classes, she returns ‘home’ to her rented flat. Every now and then, she goes ‘home’ to see her parents in London for the weekend. And every year, usually in summer, the whole family travels ‘home’ to Cyprus for a ‘visiting friends and family’ holiday.11 In this case, home is the space one currently inhabits, the place where one’s immediate family lives, and also the country of parental origins, where other family members live. Being-at-home involves the coexistence of these three registers of home, although each has very different – and fluctuating – meanings (Ahmed 1999: 338).

In her landmark book Cartographies of Diaspora, Avtar Brah makes her own contribution to the discussion on the difference between ‘home as where one is’ and ‘home as where one comes from’. On the one hand, she writes, home is the ‘lived experience of locality, its sounds and smells’. On the other, home is a ‘mythic place of desire in the diasporic imagination... a place of no return, even if it is possible to visit the geographical territory that is seen as the place of origin’ (1996: 192). Once again, we note the lack of attention in writings on diaspora to the possibility of counter-
diasporic migration; for Brah (and others) return is a desire, an imagination, perhaps a visit, but no more. As our research shows, definitive relocation of the second generation to the diasporic hearth does take place, although not always – in fact rarely – to the place exactly as imagined or anticipated. As we shall see presently, disappointment and disillusion may set in.

For members of the second generation relocating to the ‘homeland’, home is itself a two-way street. Evidence for this comes from the decorative landscape of the domestic sphere. Much has been written about migrants’ preservation and display of family photographs from ‘home’, landscape images and religious iconography – for two contrasting examples see Tolia-Kelly (2004) on artefacts in the British Asian home and Walsh (2006) on the home decoration of British expats in Dubai. Likewise the transport of souvenirs, cultural and religious ornaments, or typical food and drink, from the ancestral homeland by migrants on return visits is a further signifier of the desire to incorporate ‘origins’ and ‘nation’ into everyday life, and even into the body itself. More generally, the tangible and visible display of the ethnos in one’s home or office space constitutes a memorialisation of the place of origin, and the enactment of performativity of a cultural self whenever the objects are shown to or consumed with others.

For first- and second-generation returnees to the homeland, the cycle continues. Rhoades (1978) described the way in which Spanish labour migrants returning from Germany adorned their Andalusian village homes with ‘Black Forest’ cuckoo clocks and lavish German-made drinks cabinets. And in Greek homes of the returned Greek-Americans and Greek-Germans we visited were also to be seen artefacts of their ‘other homes’. In a similar vein, Rebecca’s father, although he had no plan to return to live permanently in Greece, had restored the family’s old village home on the island of Lesvos where the family would visit and gather every year:

And then at some stage we decided, well my parents decided... to go back to the house in Lesvos, Mytilene, which was abandoned... My father had this idea of ‘I want to fix this house’... and he managed to put a little Germanised cottage in the middle of the village in the middle of nowhere... renovate it. It’s his own way of dealing with things. And as of then – every year, Mytilene.

Return as rupture and disillusionment

As we have seen, for the second generation return migration is often viewed as a project of homecoming. But, as ever, there is a blurring of the boundaries of where ‘home’ exists: is it the territoriality of the homeland itself or a mythologised imaginative construction? In other words, homelands do not always offer the welcoming embrace of a longed-for homecoming. Experiences of return (this may be true of the first generation too) often invoke feelings of disillusionment and rupture. In the words of Markowitz and Stefansson (2004), homecomings can be ‘unsettling paths of return’.

Why is this? Hints of an answer were given earlier, so let us develop our argument further here. In an era of globalisation, increased global mobility and cultural hybridisation, migrant identifications find meaning in the interrelationship between the ethnic culture and the homeplace, especially when the illusion of the homeland experience is frozen in space and time, or distorted through partial experience. For the second generation, images of the ethnic homeland are preserved through the prism of their parents’ reconstructions of the ‘homeland in exile’ and by their selective memories and narratives of the ‘old country’.

Rebecca described her father (aged mid-70s) as typical among the older-generation Greek migrants in Germany who imagine Greece as a static place that exists exactly as it did when he left in the 1950s; this is the Greece that they try to pass on to their children.

Even when return visits take place, they occur at a time of year (summer) and to places (villages, the seaside, islands) which are redolent of a holiday atmosphere where life is lived outdoors and at a leisurely pace. For the returning family on holiday, the homeland is indeed a ‘big playground’ where life is to be enjoyed away from work, and money spent not earned.

It is clear that, for many returnees who are settling long-term, the reality of life in the ancestral homeland severely clashes with the imagined notions of a mythico-historic homeland that reflects only the subjectivities of migrant belongingness (Markowitz 2004). We need therefore to critically extend the theoretical and empirical angles of second-generation homecomings beyond the notion of an emotionally compelling existential project that mythologises the diasporic subject’s longing to be ‘home’, to that of a social project of return to the ancestral homeland (Stefansson 2004). In this ‘return of social realism’, the challenges of finding a place to live (a real home in the homeland),
economic security (usually a job) and a circle of friends become paramount. If these necessities are not achieved, or realised only with great difficulty, the homecoming dream becomes a nightmare (Christou 2006a). Experiences of return may be marked by confrontations with the social and cultural institutions in the place of origin; these institutions, together with wider behavioural norms and practices of the home society (which for the second-generation resettler becomes a host society), obstruct the social project of homecoming, to the frustration and annoyance of the returnee. Some examples from our interview data: first from Demetra who (like so many of our participants) was appalled at the corruption and lack of honesty in professional life, and struggled to find the right words to describe how she felt.

I've met a lot of people, I made a lot of connections, but I did not respect the level of... I didn't respect... what's the word? I could not stand the way they tried to get me into positions with just saying... ‘We can do this for you... you can do this for us’... Like I've met people, politicians, you know on high-end posts, even academics, that are telling me, you know, things I'm not used to. I'm used to honesty, I'm used to a lot of up-front and honest... honesty. I haven't seen that here and I'm not ready to step into a place that I can't... So anyway... the job process and of meeting people in high positions here and of getting connected here was really kind of – what can I say – dirty. It's such a dirty process. And I've seen it... you know... people pass things on to the people they know and to the people that can get them something, and this is just something I really don't like. And I don't know what to say.

Meanwhile for Rebecca the good and bad things about Greece and Germany were mirror images of themselves:

OK, in Greece the most outstanding thing for me is a kind of cultural life, the way of communication, it's a more human way for me. They take life easier and it's more emotional, I would say it's the emotional part. The most negative [thing] in Greece is... the Greek mentality; the way of living here is very eccentric. It's eccentric in the sense of me coming from a Westernised world and working in consultancy and stuff like, we're team workers and I don't find that here.

Looking at Germany, the most negative thing for me is the opposite of here. It's very unemotional but it's very well organised. And not only that, it gives you a kind of freedom... if you want to, you can get things done. Whereas here, I think you have to improvise, they absolutely revel in improvising (laughs).

The Greek evidence is not the only case. Other paths of second-generation return exist which are less unsettling, or perhaps unsettling in different ways. For the ‘returning’ Japanese-Brazilians, the ancestral homeland of Japan, although an alienating and potentially hostile place for all those who are not ‘pure’ Japanese, can nevertheless become a home even if it does not feel like a homeland. In this instance, economic reasons override the trauma of racism and social marginalisation, for their ‘invitation’ to return-migrate to Japan stemmed from the latter's shortage of labour to do factory and other low-status jobs. Not speaking much Japanese, and without the benefit of preparatory homeland visits, the Nikkeijin, mostly second- and third-generation, have reacted to their rejection by Japanese society by reviving their Brazilianness with regard to their culture and social gatherings (Tsuda 2004).

Scanning the still-small literature on second-generation return in other geographic, historical and political contexts, we appreciate the variety of situations that exist. For second-generation British Poles who were able to ‘return’ to Poland after 1989, the idealistic impulse to return soon received a reality check, and the dream of resettlement was replaced by some more pragmatic transnational homeland links such as buying a property or making periodic visits (Górny and Osipović 2006). Almost the opposite was the experience of the ‘third culture kids’ studied by Knörr (2005). These were German and Swiss children brought up by their expatriate parents in Africa who ‘came back’ to Europe for their further and higher education. For them, ‘going back’ meant returning as adults to Africa, which many intended to do but few did. Different yet again have been the experiences of Europe’s colonial repatriates, who in many cases were forced to return in the wake of decolonisation and independence in Africa and Asia. Key groups here were the British from India, Belgians from the Congo, French from Algeria, Portuguese from Angola and Mozambique, Dutch from Indonesia and Italians from Libya. The experiences of these counter-diasporic migrants retreating from colonial diasporas have been little researched: but undoubtedly they share many things in common. According to Smith (2003: 31) these migrants are
true postcolonials}; they are ‘a population that arrived in a decolonizing metropole during an era of shifting understandings of their nation’s relationships to Europe while the colony and the colonial era were quickly fading in significance’. They tend to suffer a common ‘internal strangerhood’ that results from their unwanted return – a displacement that is not only geographical, climatic etc., but also profoundly historical and political – to a different way of life and set of power structures.

The Caribbean case is more widely documented, thanks to a long tradition of migration research (and migration) in this region; particularly important has been the recent work of Potter and his associates, cited earlier. Moreover, the Caribbean case bears perhaps the greatest similarity to the research we are doing on Greece and Cyprus. From the Caribbean-focused literature it is apparent that the return as a ‘homecoming’ project is not a unified social process but a versatile cultural experience characterised by diversity, complexity and ambivalence. The return can be a source of creativeness and ingenuity that expresses strong agency and challenges fixity. For both first- and second-generation returnees to the Caribbean homeland, the experience of migration does not usually end with the return: transnational links generally continue, and both migrants and returnees are profoundly affected by their migratory experience for the rest of their lives.

Several themes emerge in studies of the second generation relocating from Britain to the Caribbean. First, such individuals are seen, and see themselves, as agents of change – as vindicators of Cerase’s ‘return of innovation’. According to research evidence from Barbados (Conway et al. 2007), second-generation returnees are a positively selected group in terms of their education and ambition.13 Hence they have much to contribute economically and socially, especially in an island-state where there has been strong economic development in recent decades, driven by tourism and service industries, notably offshore finance. Plenty of work and business opportunities exist for qualified ‘returnees’.

According to Potter and Phillips (2006b), the returnees enjoy an economically and culturally privileged status within Barbadian society. Elaborating further, the returned second generation occupy a structurally intermediate position of post-colonial hybridity; they are both black and (because of their ‘British’ upbringing and their ‘English’ accents) symbolically white, reflecting a black skin/white mask identity (cf. Fanon 1967). Potter and Phillips’ interviewees articulated the contrast they felt between how they were treated in Britain (racialised because of their Afro-Caribbean ethnicity, stereotyped as low-achievers and potential trouble-makers) and how they were perceived, and were able to position themselves, in Barbados – as smartly-dressed go-getters who traded on their English accents and work ethos.

But, against this positive identification were set more contradictory and nuanced reactions. ‘Bajan-Brits’ (to use Potter and Phillips’ term) were frustrated at the slow pace of life and delays in getting things done; they railed against the water and power cuts and found local people simple-minded and lazy. Barbadians, for their part, construct a ‘madness trope’ as a strategy of ‘othering’ the ‘English’ (Bajan-Brit) returnees, thereby fixing them outside the mainstream Barbadian society. They are constructed as mad because of their behaviour (rushing around in the heat, walking in the sun instead of in the shade, talking quickly, over-concern with punctuality), and because of stories of high rates of mental illness amongst the Caribbean population in Britain (Potter and Phillips 2006a).15

Who am I? Questions of second-generation returnee identity

Our final cultural-geographic theme touches on issues of identity amongst members of the second generation who relocate to the ‘homeland’ – or, if you will, the ‘who I am’ in the ‘where am I’ (Christou 2006d: 209). Basu (2004b: 40) sees the return as mediated on a personal level as a process of (self-)discovery: ‘it is a matter of discovering continuities with that which is beyond the self; a locating of the narratives of the self within broader narratives of families, cultures, nations and diasporas... It is without doubt a matter of social identity’ (emphasis in original). Earlier sections of the paper have suggested that evidence exists to link the second generation’s ‘return’ with a powerful search for realising their ‘true’ identity – a kind of identificational closure, which results from the achievement of a well-thought-out, organised yet personal ‘plan of action’ to relocate in this way (Christou 2006d: 68). Rebecca:

Well I’ve come back to Greece ... and I figured out there’s something you... there’s something that feels different, and I started to look at this question of ‘who you are’ in a different way. It’s not who you want to be, it’s who you are, and that’s a different question, that you can feel with your body, your soul, with whatever you can... I have been able to find a sense of stability... I feel that I’m accepted
and that people make me feel I belong… It’s a part of my life I haven’t discovered yet and I think I need to in order to become a whole.

But other evidence, such as that presented in the section immediately above, contradicts this image of finding home and true identity in the homeland: disillusionment and even alienation set in as a result of experiences which pile up. In her narrative Demetra described losing her teaching post in Athens and having to fight for the redundancy pay she was legally entitled to; getting robbed (twice) in the city; the corruption and laziness inherent in the public health service; the lack of a sense of customer service in shops and business; the bureaucracy which stifles every attempt to get ahead (‘you need a thousand papers for everything…’). After a few years, she said, you learn how to play the game:

I’ve been here six years. The longer you stay, you get to know how it works. Like, you know, playing Monopoly, or playing chess. If you practise you get to know the code, how the other person plays, so you’re going to play better…

But there are compensations: the closer family bonds, the greater safety in which to bring up your children (Demetra described how a bullet went through the door of a classroom in a school she used to teach at in California), the everyday friendliness (and the constant swearing!).

When it came to summing up her identity, Demetra struggled: was she Greek-American or American-Greek? Why was it always that the Greek part of the hyphenated word came first? ‘Where do I belong? I belong in the Atlantic… it’s like a global mailman…’. Rebecca, too, despite what she said above about being made to feel she belonged in Greece, expressed fundamental doubts about her ‘true’ Greek identity and belonging:

… on the other hand you’re a stranger because you’ll never be one of them, you cannot because you grew up somewhere else… But that’s OK because it’s a matter of accepting the fact that you don’t belong here… I’ll never turn into a Greek woman, I cannot. I can understand them, I can look at them and I can understand the culture and the mentality but I’ll never be one of them.

Intriguingly, Potter and Phillips (2006b: 592) found that some ‘Bajan-Brits’ did not ‘belong’ anywhere: their identities, too, were suspended in ‘mid-air’ over the Atlantic. More specifically, Bajan-Brits expressed their status of living in the plural world of their parents’ origin, after having been raised in the colonial ‘mother country’, as one of ‘liminal, hybrid and in-between positionality’. Such a complex identity statement reflects cross-cutting issues of race, colour, class, gender, age and friendship which are likely to be inherent in the experiences of second-generation transnational migrants (Potter and Phillips 2006b: 586). For Bajan-Brits and other second-generation Caribbeans, the return to the Caribbean is not necessarily to be regarded as so counter-intuitive as the return of some other widely dispersed diasporic groups. In her own study of Barbadian migrants Chamberlain (1997) refers frequently to the island’s ‘culture of migration’ as one of economic necessity and flexibility, combining family loyalty with individual migration plans which can include the back and forth migration of the generations at different stages of their lives.

Undoubtedly there is much more that could be said about second-generation return and identity. The return adds another layer of complexity to the multiple, hybrid and hyphenated identities that have become increasingly discussed in the anthropological and cultural-studies literatures on migration (e.g. Chambers 1994; Hall 1996; Rapport and Dawson 1998). These authors (and many others, including ourselves) see identity in migration as relational, constructed, processual and situational. Rather than launch into an extended discussion of migrancy and identity, we close this part of the paper with a further commentary on what Rebecca says about her own relocation from Germany to Greece. Rebecca’s case is particularly interesting because of the ‘double duality’ of her ethnic background (Greek father, German mother) and of her migration trajectory (born in Germany, living in Greece). First, Rebecca described the dialectical duel that rained down on her as a small child from various members of her family asking what she preferred to be and what was better:

‘Are you Greek, are you German? Do you like me more or the other one?’ Things like that. For a kid, it’s like, ‘What the hell do they want from your life?’ And I think that, what it was, it was for many, many years, trying to figure out both sides. It was just a reaction of trying to please people. OK, so they tell me ‘You’re more Greek’, so you try to be more Greek. Or they tell me, ‘You’re more this’ and you try to be more this… So there was a long, long time in my life, until my mid-thirties, where I have felt this thing, until I figured out: ‘Listen, you’re just Rebecca. You’re not Greek, you’re not
German, you’re not whatever the hell you are. This is yourself and that’s what it is. Meanwhile I don’t feel split any more, I do just fine.

Rebecca then related how, before she relocated to Greece, she had met a Jewish woman in Germany who had been living all over the world herself and has been split around with identity crisis and all that stuff, and she helped me a lot ... to get ideas about how to deal with that. Because ... I haven’t really talked about this with too many people ... you’re not crazy, you’re not really an exception to the rule or something, it’s just a normal thing to be... That is what makes you feel ‘Wow! There are other people!’ [just like me]. I remember I found this book, an American book about rootless children ... who are children from the American military who had lived all over the place... I could see at least ten different authors having the same ideas and facing the same issues as I was. A feeling of relief, so to say.

Finally Rebecca was asked whether she felt her identity had changed since she’d been living in Greece now for three years:

It’s difficult to say ... um ... have I changed? I have found myself, so I haven’t really changed. I’m more relaxed. I haven’t changed. But I probably can be more myself. If there was a change, it happened before. Because that change made me come here.

Conclusion

Return migrants are the voices we never hear in migration history (King 2000), which usually focuses on the struggles and successes of those migrants who stay on. This paper, by focusing on a particular form of return, that of the second generation, exposes an even deeper historical amnesia associated with this mobility form. Paul Basu, whose inspirational writing on ‘roots return’ we have quoted from extensively in this paper, regards such homecoming visits as ‘heuristic journeys’ to ‘sites of memory, sources of identity and shrines of self’ (2001: 338, italics in original). Such journeys, as we have shown, provide an opportunity for self-discovery through a process of self-narration. Our dialogic approach has demonstrated how the second generation’s ‘return’ and the narration of this return are performative acts during which the migrant, through the story of the self, is (re)located in the story of the familial, the ancestral, the national and ultimately within the transnational diaspora.

But there are multiple ambiguities built into both our conceptualisation of counter-diasporic migration as a neglected chronotope of mobility, and into the ambivalent experiences of Demetra and Rebecca, whose returns seem to hover uncertainly between the closure of a definitive return ‘home’ on the one hand, and an expression of ongoing transnational identity on the other.

Let us take the empirical dimension of this dual question first. As examples of the actors of global post-modernity, Demetra and Rebecca globalise their personal biographies beyond the borders of the nation-state; they articulate feelings of being at home (and also not-at-home) in several places – what Beck (2000) terms ‘transnational spatial polygamy’. Both Rebecca and Demetra have quite complex mobility histories, the full details of which we have not revealed in our account above; their parents and grandparents, too, have multiple migration experiences which, arguably, have shaped their families’ mobility narratives and identities. These cases remind us that ‘being grounded is not necessarily about being fixed; and being mobile is not necessarily about being detached’ (Ahmed et al. 2003: 1). Or, to quote another well-known author who has entered the fray with some weighty arguments: ‘In a globalized, diaspora-prone society, it may be that neither the place of birth, nor one’s generation are of much predictive power in terms of how one sees the world’ (Loizos 2007: 197).

At a micro scale, one of the most revealing objectives of diaspora research is to illuminate the complex processes by which migrants mediate and reconcile the contradictions between the diasporic condition, the notion of ‘home’ and the role of the homeland as an actual (or denied or destroyed) nation-state. In this context, ‘home’, as a context and as a symbol, should be problematised as a social and kinship space; a signifier that encapsulates actions, interrelationships and feelings and thus is a social, cultural and political container of meaning. Hence, ‘diaspora’ is not only a lived experience but also a theoretical concept that unravels the unsettled and unsettling consciousness of the state of migrancy.

To return to the second, more theoretical part of the question posed above: Is counter-diasporic migration – defined as we have here as the return of the second and subsequent generations to the diasporic hearth – counter-intuitive or is it, in fact,
part of the very essence of diaspora? The answer to this question turns around the different ways the term diaspora is itself defined and conceptualised. In its Greek origins, its meaning is to ‘sow or scatter across’ – thus it is fundamentally a movement of dispersal. This reflects the colonising/imperial scattering and settlement of the Ancient Greeks across the Mediterranean and beyond; an etiology which, for sure, admits a diachronic long-term relationality with the Athenian hearth but does not assume any inevitability of return. In the other, now more-commonly-used version of diaspora theory, the desirability or inevitability of return is part of the definition of a diaspora; reference to Safran’s (1991) six criteria shows that return figures prominently, and so in that sense counter-diasporic migration is the quintessential concluding moment of the diaspora cycle. And yet, viewed through the more temporally restricted prism of the migration, integration and transnationalism literatures, second-generation relocation in the homeland is indeed illogical, unless it represents the deferred ambition of the first generation to return, transmitted explicitly or implicitly to the children of the immigrants. This is a hypothesis which, at first sight, does not seem very plausible, but certainly is interesting and worthy of further investigation.

Acknowledgements

This paper is the first published product of our AHRC project, which has the same title as the paper. We gratefully acknowledge the financial backing of the AHRC under its ‘Diasporas, Migration and Identities’ programme, and the support of the programme director Professor Kim Knott. Thanks, too, to our project team colleagues, Prof. Ivor Goodson and Janine Givati-Teerling, and to Dr Tracey Reynolds, who became a de facto team member during her secondment fellowship at Sussex from London South Bank University. An earlier version of this paper was presented at a seminar in the Institute for the Study of European Transformations, London Metropolitan University, on 26 November 2007. Thanks to Prof. Mary Hickman, Dr. Nicola Mai and Prof. Allan Williams for their discussion of our paper.

Notes

[1] This project is financed by the Arts and Humanities Research Council under their ‘Diasporas, Migration and Identities’ programme (grant ID no. AH/E508601X/1) and runs for three years 2007-2009.

[2] Tölöyan is the founding editor of the journal Diasporas: A Journal of Transnational Studies, whose very title combines the diasporic and the transnational.

[3] There is no space to justify this remark here, but see Clifford who also points out that even the Jewish diaspora fails to meet the full set of criteria, notably the ‘real desire’ for return. Clifford also notes (1994: 305) that the Jewish case is historically extremely complicated, with multiple instances of ‘rediasporisation’ – something which also characterises parts of the Greek diasporic record. Returning to Safran’s paper, we cannot resist one further observation: why does he spend the rest of the article describing each of the listed diasporas in turn, except the Greek one which is completely omitted?

[4] Integration and assimilation are both terms of shifting and overlapping meaning, and subjects of a wide-ranging debate in the US, Europe and elsewhere. ‘Assimilation’ is more prominent in US immigration discourse where there has traditionally been a prevailing assumption towards a hegemonic ‘American’ society based on erosion of ethnic roots. ‘Integration’ has been more favoured in European debates, reflecting normative models of a more multicultural or pluralistic society. But this is just to skim the surface of a complex discussion in which, for example, both the heuristic and policy meaning of ‘assimilation’ have recently been more positively reappraised, even in Europe. For recent insights into this debate see Alba and Nee (1997), Brubaker (2001) and Esser (2004).

[5] The changes have to do with the predominantly ‘Third World’ origin of the newer immigrants, the contraction of economic opportunities in these countries consequent upon the debt crises of the 1980s and neoliberal economic restructuring, as well as the polarisation of employment opportunities in the US ‘hourglass’ economy, with immigrants largely confined to low-paid, low-status, insecure forms of labour (Eckstein 2002: 214).

[6] Interestingly, although Kertzer is punctilious in his teasing out of different meanings of
generation, he is less careful about gender, committing the common sin of ascribing male gender to an unknown author (1983: 129).

[7] This is not the place for a review of this transnational migration literature which, as noted earlier, overlaps to some extent with the literature on diasporas. For a geographer’s overview see Bailey (2001); for other reviews, which reference all the classic debates on transnationalism of the 1990s, see the special issue of International Migration Review edited by Levitt et al. (2003)

[8] This may have been because Baldassar’s study was on emigrants from a small hill-town in the Venetian Alps, and migrants who visited there quickly tired of village gossip and narrow-mindedness.

[9] To cite one example, see King (1977) on the problems of school-age second-generation children taken by their returning parents to Italy where they were often put in classes with younger pupils. In another study, also set in southern Italy, King et al. (1986) found that quite a common reason for return amongst young married adults was so that their young children could be educated in the Italian school system; hence the return was timed before children had reached school age. This reasoning was often based on the migrants’ observation that other migrants who had stayed on found that, once their children were educated in the foreign school system (of Germany, France or wherever), return became very unlikely. On the other hand, prioritising children’s education in the home-country system and language meant an often difficult search for employment on the part of the parents. For some generalised remarks about educational issues of children in the context of family-based return migration see Dumon (1986).

[10] The Cyprus part of our project is being carried out by Janine Givati-Teerling for her Sussex DPhil, supported by an AHRC studentship.

[11] This simple example has parallels in Sarah Ahmed’s discussion of multiple homes, which draws partly on her own experience as British-born second-generation Pakistani (Ahmed 1999).

[12] There are some special features of the Japanese Brazilian counter-diasporic migration which need emphasising. First, this is a form of labour-migration recruitment which is not dissimilar to that which characterised North-West Europe in the early postwar decades. Like this European guestworker migration, the movement of Nikkeijin started as temporary employment in the late 1980s, but has since matured to semi-permanent settlement bolstered by family reunion. The Japanese for their part look down on their co-ethnic cousins from South America for several reasons: their origins are perceived as low-status Japanese who left Japan because of poverty and unemployment; they continue to be classed as low status because of the low-grade factory jobs they are employed to do, often on short-term contracts; and they are socially marginalised because of their poor Japanese language skills and their unavoidable loss of ‘Japaneseness’ by virtue of their living outside of Japan for most of their lives.

[13] It is not clear whether this is sample bias or a more-or-less true representation of the second-generation flow to Barbados. Potter and Phillips (2006a; 2006b) interviewed 51 ‘returnees’, including 32 born outside Barbados (29 in the UK); of the remaining 19 Barbados-born, all had spent significant parts of their formative years abroad, again the majority of them in the UK. For the sample of 51, the average age at the time of interview (in 2002) was 40 years; the average at return was 32 years. The sample was skewed towards females (38 out of the 51); again it is not clear whether this truly reflects a female predominance in the return flow (probably not).

[14] This may not be the case for some smaller or poorer islands.

[15] This ‘historical-clinical’ narrative actually went further, because of the practice in the UK in the 1960s of repatriating West Indian immigrants who were certified mentally sick (Potter and Phillips 2006a: 593).

References


Christou, A. (2006b) Crossing boundaries - ethnicizing employment - gendering labor:


University of Warsaw, Centre for Migration Research, Working Papers 6/64.


