# Contents

*Acknowledgments* ix  

1. Great Powers in World Politics 1  
2. The Origins of the Great Power Role 15  
3. Confronting the Twentieth Century 47  
4. The Contradictions of the UN Order 63  
5. The Anachronism of the Great Powers 85  
6. The Greatest Power? 113  
7. The Impact of the Emerging Powers 141  
8. Power and Order in Contemporary World Politics 171  

*List of Acronyms* 185  
*Bibliography* 187  
*Index* 201  
*About the Book* 209
On the evening of April 25, 1945, hundreds of diplomats filed into San Francisco’s luxurious Opera House to attend a glittering ceremony orchestrated by a Broadway musical designer. It was the opening not of the latest operatic production but of an international conference with an ambition not reflected in the event’s somewhat awkward and colorless name, the Conference on the International Organization. The diplomats had gathered to undertake negotiations that would lead to a unique creation. As the strategic tide had turned in World War II, the Allied powers began to plan for the world that would come once the war was won. They sought not only to reconstruct the devastated economies and societies of Europe and Asia, but to create international conditions that would prevent the recurrence of another systemwide conflict, the second cataclysmic war of their lifetimes. Many had hoped that the first of those would end all wars; yet it was but a tragic prelude to the astonishing destruction of the second. The ingenuity of industrialization fused to the protean power of nationalism had produced a capacity for violence and devastation for which the term total war seemed almost inadequate. As research into atomic weapons began to yield results, the need to build reliable mechanisms to manage international order and to prevent war among the powerful took on an existential urgency. It was with these ideas firmly in mind that the representatives took their seats in the Opera House to begin the negotiations.

Postwar policy elites saw multilateralism as fundamental to securing international order. In the set of Bretton Woods institutions, they created bodies that would oversee the reconstruction of the ruined economies, stabilize the circumstances of international economic relations, and preclude nationalism from interfering in the business of capitalism. On the political front, they believed that international peace and security required the creation of a univer-
sal international institution that would manage the political differences between states and stabilize the military and security aspects of the international order. The original vision for the United Nations was not just of an international mechanism that would promote cooperation. Rather, it was to be the centerpiece of a system in which order would be achieved by harnessing power to principle. It was to be universal—all states, regardless of stature, that were committed to this ideal could join—and it would protect the rights of all sovereign states, regardless of regime type, ideology, or interests. The United Nations was to be nothing short of an institution that oversaw the rule of law governing the international system. It was this towering ambition, to create a multilateral body to manage the political and strategic relations of the postwar world, that brought the delegates to the Bay City. The conference proceedings reflected the difficulty of realizing such lofty aims, yet the delegates clearly recognized the unparalleled circumstances that had created this opportunity. The breadth of issues covered, to say nothing of the interests many were keen to protect, meant that the participants’ often larger-than-life personalities clashed in quite striking ways. Chairing the entire conference was the dashing but evidently out-of-his depth Edward Stettinius. The lead delegate from the USSR, foreign minister and Stalin’s protégé Vyacheslav Molotov, regularly threatened to walk out on proceedings as he thought, and not entirely incorrectly, that the UN could easily become a tool of the capitalist powers. At one point, a senior US delegate, Texas senator Arthur Vandenberg, even ripped up a draft of the charter to drive home a point.¹

The reason for Vandenberg’s confetti was not just his taste for melodrama, but because of widespread discontent among the delegates about something that the planners had felt was the putative organization’s most important feature: the privileged place that was granted to the great powers. At the center of the proposal put to the conference was a council that would be superior to the other parts of the institution and that would be tasked with responsibility for questions of international peace and security. The membership and decision-making processes of this council represented a belief by the UN’s designers that a small group of powerful states had to be given a special status to ensure the orderly functioning of the organization. Unsurprisingly, this met with opposition in San Francisco. Many were uneasy with the idea that the small group should be identified at the outset and named as members of the council in perpetuity. Permanency in a world of dramatic change seemed a recipe for built-in obsolescence. Not only did it undermine key principles that the organization would purportedly protect, such as sovereign equality, it cemented problems of legitimacy into the foundations of the body. However, the main point of contention focused on the council’s voting procedures. A group of states, led by Australian foreign minister H. V. Evatt, attempted to limit the way in which the proposed permanent members of the council could use their ability to veto decisions. Although these efforts ultimately failed, the dispute
derived from a deep-seated and ultimately unresolved tension. On the one hand, the putative organization was to embody the fundamental idea of modern international relations: all sovereign states are equal, regardless of stature. On the other hand, many believed that international order could emerge only if the small number of preponderant powers underpinned the system by exercising special privileges.

Planners and delegates had the experience of the League of Nations, and its failings, foremost in mind. The lesson of the League that most delegates seemed to draw upon was that while recognition of sovereignty through the representation of all was very important, any attempt to promote order needed to face the reality of significant power inequalities among states. In an international system lacking a formal and substantive center of authority, those who had the resources were the only ones in a position to act in a way that could ensure compliance with broader rules. The UN order was intended to be one in which rules and not raw power mattered most, and this meant that power inequalities had to be incorporated into the system. The challenge was to work out how inequalities in power could be harnessed to promote order. The founders of the United Nations did this by giving the powerful special rights in return for certain responsibilities. The logic reflected the need to provide the powerful with incentives to participate because the legal order they sought needed the powerful to think of their interests in new ways. The question of their participation was not guaranteed. As Vandenberg’s actions made abundantly clear, if the United States did not get what it sought—special treatment in the form of the veto—the institution would suffer the same fate as the League: death on the floor of the United States Senate.

This much is well known. The conference produced an agreed-upon United Nations Charter and led to the creation of what has proven to be a remarkably successful institution that sits at the center of an ever-growing network of institutions and processes attempting to promote international cooperation as well as at the symbolic heart of an extremely complex and expanding international system. What is less well recognized is that the UN system, and more particularly the UN Security Council (UNSC), represents the institutionalization of a long-term historical process whereby a special place has been accorded to the powerful to manage international order. The structures established at San Francisco were shaped not, as many claim, simply because multilateralism had to doff its cap to the realities of power, but by a particular understanding of the kind of role that great powers were thought to play in producing international order. The deal that was struck at San Francisco—wherein great powers were to be treated differently and in return for which they manage order—represented a traditional diplomatic compromise as well as the more deeply held belief that only by legally enshrining the unequal position of the great powers could the kind of international order that was envisioned in 1945 be achieved. The structure of the United Nations embodies a
particular answer to a series of fundamental questions: What is the relationship between inequalities of power and stable, orderly relations in the anarchy of the international system? What role do institutions and the rule of law play in such a system? How important are ideas and principles in relation to material factors such as wealth and military power? To each of these, the UN Charter sets out clear, if not unproblematic, answers. In this setting, great powers were thought to be the guarantors of the system, representing the particular way in which the United Nations aimed to harness the uneven distribution of power among states to foster systemwide stability. Without great power privilege, and the assumptions on which it rests, the international rule of law that the UN sought to create would be entirely unimaginable.

Yet, throughout its life, the Security Council has rarely worked as intended. The Council’s shortcomings, in the Cold War and beyond, have prompted a near continuous demand for reform. Defenders of the existing structure fall back on essentially similar arguments to those made in 1945: it is necessary to recognize the realities of existing circumstances and the need for great powers to be granted special privileges to ensure that they participate and underwrite the system. While the United Nations struggled with the ideological freeze of the Cold War, and the rapid expansion of its membership brought on by decolonization, one could find excuses for the failings of the UN in contextual circumstances. But it is contemporary experience—the absence of an ideological divide, globalization, and the emergence of a range of large and ambitious powers—that insists that we ask whether the institutional design of the current order is appropriate to current circumstances and whether the assumptions on which it rests need to be rethought. A fundamental part of this is questioning what role great powers play in the contemporary system.

The creation of the United Nations was an explicit attempt to place great power managerialism at the heart of the postwar order. It was premised on the idea that the process of active cooperation among the most powerful had created Europe’s remarkably peaceful nineteenth century and that the League had failed precisely because it had not incorporated this principle into its structures. The purpose of this book is to examine the origins of the idea of great power managerialism, an idea of fundamental importance to the current order. In particular, it aims to show that the political and social conditions that make great power managerialism able to impart international order not only no longer exist, they have not done so for over 100 years.

Why This Book?

The UN order was established on the assumption that great powers could manage international relations through judicious diplomacy, institutional process,
and the exercise of power. There appear to be good reasons to question whether these assumptions remain convincing, if indeed, they ever were. Given the immensity and immediacy of changing power configurations in contemporary world politics, it is necessary to consider the origins and status of great power managerialism.

It is almost a truism that great powers shape the parameters of life in the international system. In the anarchical realm, those who have the greatest concentrations of power, and particularly military force, have been of greatest importance. As such much of the empirical and theoretical literature in international relations (IR) is concerned with the actions of the powerful. This is perhaps most clearly expressed in Kenneth Waltz’s structural theory of international politics, which is built on the idea that a theory of international politics is by definition a theory about great powers, understood as the militarily most powerful actors in the system.3 But this depiction of international relations, while clearly a function of the particular kind of theory Waltz was attempting to craft, overlooks important, non-power-related factors that fundamentally shape international politics, such as the role of norms, values, ideas, and their historical evolution. Furthermore, it neglects the way in which the actual conduct of international relations has led to the creation of the idea of a special group of states, which has been incorporated in the constitutional structures of international order. In the various legal settlements that became increasingly important to the character of international order, in Westphalia, Utrecht, Vienna, and of course San Francisco, one sees the imprint of great powers. Not only do the great powers seek to shape the political and economic order in their own interest, in these settlements they have been accorded a kind of managerial function in the broader system. In their efforts to do so they have molded not merely the veneer of legalism to this order, they have established the structural limits of an order so conceived.

The purpose of this book is to provide an extensive analysis of the origins and current status of the idea that great powers are distinctive members of international society that carry a particular managerial burden and to consider the continued utility of this idea in contemporary world politics. I seek to answer four related questions: What role does great power managerialism play in international order? How did this idea emerge? Can it provide order in a globalizing international system? What does the status of the idea of the great powers tell us about the nature of international order in the twenty-first century?

While the status of great powers and their role is of perennial importance to students of international relations, a contemporary study of great power managerialism is particularly pertinent for a number of reasons. First, although the idea of great powers is central to the discipline of international relations, and to the practice of the current order, the topic has been neglected in the contemporary literature. Recent studies that have dealt with the great
powers have done so either as part of a broader theoretical endeavor, such as Mearsheimer’s efforts to elaborate his “offensive realism”; as focal points for assessing factors that influence foreign policy choice, such as Haas’s examination of the role of ideology in shaping great power preferences; or as part of an assessment of uneven treatment in international law. There has been no sustained examination of the role that great powers play in international society published in the past ten years and, more remarkably, given the policy interest in the emerging powers and their prospects of “greatness,” there is little sustained reflection on what it means to be a great power in the current order.

Second, in the first two decades of the twenty-first century, the balance of world power appears to be in flux. Few would doubt the place of the United States atop the global totem pole, but after the self-inflicted damage done to its reputation and strategic capacity by the Bush administration and its aftermath, as well as the global financial crisis of 2008–2009, there is cause to reconsider the millennial assumptions that this century would be as “American” as the last. The spectacular economic success of China and India, the return of Russia, the new-found confidence of Brazil, and an expanded and consolidated European Union (EU) give many reasons to think that international relations are set for considerable change. The rising powers are important not only because of their size and newfound wealth, but also due to their ambition to assert themselves at the global level. World politics is beginning to enter a phase of power redistribution, and it is vital that we are as well equipped as possible to make intellectual and policy sense of these changes.

The rise of China, India, and Russia and the emergence of Brazil and South Africa, as states of global importance, prompts questions of how much power they have and are likely to acquire; much ink, both scholarly and policy related, has been spilled trying to determine whether or when these rising powers will achieve the lofty status of a “great power.” Their emergence also forces us to consider what it might mean for the structure of the existing international order. One of the most compelling criticisms of the UN-centered order is the anachronistic distribution of power that the permanent membership of the Security Council reflects. As more power and influence is acquired by large, populous, and non-Western states and societies, both the institutional and normative underpinnings of the current order will be put under considerable stress.

Third, the specific changes associated with the emergence of new powers and the relative decline of the North Atlantic states is a result of the broader transformative effects of globalization and provides further perspective on that process. While globalization has not yet led to the creation of a post-Westphalian political and economic order, it is nonetheless driving changes in the strategies of states, reducing the effectiveness of some approaches, and providing those who can respond best to its circumstances with unparalleled
opportunities. It also helps accelerate the growth and impact of emerging powers, while enabling relatively weak groupings to be able to exert their will over others in ways that previously would not have been possible. Globalization is subtly but profoundly changing the rules of the game in world politics and its implications for great powers—both their individual prospects and the broader role of great power managerialism—have been significant. In some ways, globalization’s impact on the great powers is a microcosm of the changes it is bringing to bear across the system; it is important, easy to overstate, and occurring in unexpected and uneven ways.

Before moving into the argument proper, it is important to clarify the particular view of the great power role that is the focus of this book, that of great power managerialism. While there is a range of different accounts of what great powers are and their systemic role, this book is concerned with the notion that is most important to the politico-legal principles of the current order and that is itself in keeping with an influential strand of thought in international relations theory.

What Is Great Power Managerialism?

What are great powers and how do they shape international order? The theoretical literature in international relations proposes three main ways of identifying great powers and the role that they play. The first sees great powers defined purely in terms of material capabilities, the second in terms of the nature of their interests, and the third sees great powers as authoritative or managerial players on the international stage.

The most common approach to conceptualizing great powers focuses on their preponderance of material power. This group argues that in the modern international system, those states that are at the top of the military tree—however that may be defined—are of interest not simply because of their weight but because the distribution of power is thought to be of fundamental importance to the international system. The most influential classical articulation of this view was penned by the German father of historicism, Leopold von Ranke. His famous essay “The Great Powers” surveys the variegated fortunes of Europe’s major powers from the late 1680s until the mid-nineteenth century and argues that the emergence and interplay of great powers represents an unfolding of world history. Not only have great powers emerged to defend their interests in particular circumstances, the very idea of a great power as a specific kind of entity was a function of this process. Indeed, his depiction has been of particular influence on the way in which the emergence of great powers is thought to be a natural, even inevitable, part of the evolution of international systems. This process of naturalization will be discussed further in the next chapter. Ranke’s oft-cited definition notes that “if one could establish as a def-
inition of a great power that it must be able to maintain itself against all others, even when they are united, then Frederick had raised Prussia to that position.”

The best example of this approach in contemporary scholarship comes from Waltz’s seminal work of neorealist theory. The rank of great power is determined by “how they score on all of the following items: size of population and territory; resource endowment; economic capacity; military strength; political stability; and competence.” For Waltz, having a supremely effective fighting force will not get a state to the top table unless it is able to match the others in the system in all the other measures.

For a second group, great powers can be identified by (and their distinctive role in the system follows from) both their material power attributes as well as the character of their interests. The broad-ranging character of the concerns of these states, in terms of geographic scope and breadth of issue area, are such that they play a distinctly different role in international society than ordinary powers. The classical statement of this position comes from the British historian Arnold Toynbee. Articulated in a study of the international relations of the post–World War I era, he asserts that a “Great Power may be defined as a political force exerting an effect co-extensive with the widest range of the society in which it operates.” Unusually, he argues that the historically distinctive character of great powers emerged in the aftermath of the 1417 Council of Constance, which brought about the end of the great papal schism. While the origins of the great power role will be considered in further detail in the next chapter, his approach is significant here because it overlays an important political dimension on the foundation of power.

Explicitly drawing on this approach, Martin Wight argues that “great powers are powers with general interests, i.e., whose interests are as wide as the states-system itself, which today means world-wide.” The key point for Wight lies in the relationship of the state to the system and more particularly to the way in which the system operates. In Wight’s view, it is the expansion of a European practice of diplomacy and international relations to a global stage that makes the idea of distinguishing the “great powers” from all the others of particular interest. Similarly, Robert Jervis sets out a conception of great powers in which their distinctive place is a function of their position in the system:

A great power is more tightly connected to larger numbers of other states than is a small power. Because it has involvements all over the world, a great power is at least slightly affected by most changes in relations of other states. Although most states had not direct concerns in Vietnam, they were affected by what happened there because of the changes in US policy that the war produced.

The third strand of thinking within the literature associates great powers not only with power, but also with a degree of organizational responsibility.
The most clear-cut, and influential, expression of this approach is set out by Hedley Bull, who argues that great powers actively working to manage the system are a fundamental feature of the modern order. As he writes, they “contribute to international order in two main ways: by managing their relations with one another, and by exploiting their preponderance in such a way as to impart a degree of central direction to the affairs of international society as a whole.” Similarly, Gerry Simpson argues that this process, entailing the substantive predominance of the great powers in a system of formal equality, is recognized in the practices, and some of the principles, of international law, a situation he describes as “legalised hegemony.” This idea attempts to capture the awkward middle ground that exists between the formal equality that is the letter of international law—and the core principle of international politics—and the substantive inequality of world politics as it actually exists. Like Bull, Simpson argues that legalized hegemony entails the great powers carrying categorically different roles from ordinary members of international society, which derive from their special rights as great powers, but which also imply a particular set of duties. Simpson’s approach identifies great powers by their substantial military capacity, the systemic character of their interests, and the particular status that has been accorded them by the structures of legalized hegemony. Great powers have responsibilities to the international system that convey certain rights and, as such, great powers are not beholden to the sorts of moral, legal, and political constraints experienced by normal members of international society.

Central to this third group is the recognition by other states that the great powers exist as a distinctive, and unequal, category of membership of international society. It is important because it is thought to be central to providing stability to the system through the explicit management by the powerful. Great powers, from this perspective, are not states like any other. They carry a particular role of responsibility to the system and are central to maintaining order under conditions of anarchy. Order depends on harnessing inequality for the overall benefit of the system. In doing so, it puts an important contradiction at the system’s center, given the formal significance of sovereign equality as a fundamental organizational principle. Inequality is thus not something unfortunate with which one must live, but is a necessary means of reconciling the uneven distribution of power with the fact of anarchy.

As the foundational proposition of the international system, the principle of sovereignty and its corollary, the formal equality of all sovereign states, creates an anarchical system. Great power managerialism assumes that great powers are different from ordinary members of international society and, as such, they have a key part to play in managing international order as well as protecting the underlying system and the values that it represents. Central to this proposition is the belief that the interests of the powerful are linked fundamentally to the underlying values that the system advances. Minor powers
may be frustrated by the evident hypocrisies of international society, but they put up with them not only because they must, but also because they recognize that the existing configuration of the international system depends upon it.\textsuperscript{17}

This brief overview of the three main approaches to the great powers shows the considerable diversity of views as to what great powers are as well as the absence of consensus as to precisely the kind of role they are thought to play. This also underlines the important point that there is no correct interpretation of what the great powers do or what their role in the international system ought to be. While some see the special place of great powers deriving from their capacity to act as guarantors of international order, others see it as a manifestation of, or evidence for, the existence of an international society. This is neatly articulated by Ian Clark: “Order exists when the Great Powers perform the dual tasks of both managing their relations with each other and also imparting a degree of central direction to the workings of the international society as a whole.”\textsuperscript{18} Others take a more skeptical view of things. Wight points out that the notion that great powers club together to manage the system is more often than not a self-serving delusion. “History affords little support for the assertion the great powers like to make that they are more restrained and responsible than minor powers. It suggests, rather, that they wish to monopolize the right to create international conflict.”\textsuperscript{19} In this book I will explore how the idea of great power managerialism has evolved and show that while the great power function may appear to be a “natural” feature of international relations, it is in fact the product of a specific set of historical, material, and ideational processes and as such is always subject to change. As Morgenthau claims, the idea of “the great powers” as “an institution of international politics and organization, carrying differences in legal status . . . sprang from the brains of Castlereagh and became the very foundation of the scheme adopted in 1815.”\textsuperscript{20}

The preceding discussion draws attention to the range of views about great powers and shows that while the concept has become a central feature of the current international legal architecture, it is not the only way of making sense of the role of powerful states in an anarchic system. Thus while there is no specific function of the great powers that is applicable across time, a particular conception has become more important to the workings of the international system. In the current order, the idea of the great powers that is built into the constitutional foundations of the international system most closely resembles the account described in the third strand discussed above. The great powers have been cemented into the centerpiece of the international legal and political order that is run through the United Nations and, as will be discussed in the coming chapters, draws directly on this kind of thinking about what great powers are and their function in managing international order. In this book, then, I will examine the historical emergence of this idea, its gradual constitutionalization in various institutional efforts to manage
international order, and the particular challenges that this idea faces in the early twenty-first century.

It is useful at the outset to summarize the core ideas of great power managerialism. First, great powers are generally understood to be in the top tier of military powers in the international system and that their interests are understood as bound up across the system as a whole. Second, those states are distinguished from normal members of international society by a set of rights and responsibilities that they owe to international society as a whole. They have the right to exempt themselves from key norms and laws in return for which they have a broader obligation to help manage international order and to ensure that the values it represents are protected. Third, membership in the great power grouping is primarily a function of the recognition accorded the powers by international society more broadly. This is not simply the crude supplication of the weak at the altar of power, but in recognizing great powers in this way, states give some basic consent to and acceptance of the legitimacy of this arrangement. Other states consent to the substantive inequalities that overlay the system of formal equality and are reflected by the institution of the “great powers,” even if this consent is at times somewhat begrudging. They do so because in a basic systemic sense it serves their interests.

This view—that a system of formal equality in which power is in fact unevenly distributed must endow the most powerful states with special rights and responsibilities so that they maintain order—has become a central feature of the contemporary international order, even while it contradicts some of the core norms that underpin the modern system. I aim to show that this idea should be understood as a specific political, legal, and diplomatic response to the inequalities of power that exist in a system of political relations founded on the principle of formal juridical equality in which there is no central authority to enforce principles and rules and, more broadly, maintain order.

Structure of the Book

The longevity of the UN system and the changes in the UN’s conduct have obscured the fact that the institution’s managerial vision of international order, with great powers acting as collective guarantors of the order, represents an unusual and by no means the only, or indeed even optimal, way of organizing international relations in the post–World War II world. While great powers have always played a distinctive and singularly important part in international relations, the managerial version embodied in the United Nations is the product of a very specific history that produced a particular vision for the way in which disparities of power could be tamed, or at the very least harnessed, for a broader systemic benefit. My central argument is that the managerial conception of international order, and the particular role of the
great powers within that order, is an outdated approach to organizing international relations.

In Chapter 2, I examine the historical origins of the idea that great powers act as key managers of international order and, in particular, the nineteenth-century circumstances that allowed great power managerialism to work. Chapters 3 and 4 examine the way in which the great power role established in the nineteenth century has become increasingly formally integrated into the structures of twentieth-century international society. In Chapter 3, I focus on how this was attempted through the creation of the League of Nations. In Chapter 4, I explore the place of the great powers in the constitutional structure of the United Nations.

Chapter 5 is concerned with the extent to which the idea of the great powers that is incorporated in the current international order is appropriate under contemporary circumstances. Attention is paid both to the structural problems of great power management and to the changes in the context of world politics that have made the exercise of the great power role increasingly problematic. In the context of these problems, in Chapter 6, I examine the place of the United States in the international system as a means of considering the contemporary character of the great power role. Then, in Chapter 7, I consider the current implications of the emergence of a number of powers of global weight and significance. Chapter 8 is a brief conclusion that includes a reiteration of the main lines of argument put forward in the book. Here I also reflect on some of the broader challenges that this study has uncovered.

In examining the origins, contemporary challenges, and emerging prospects of the great power role, I have emphasized how some of the bedrock foundations of the postwar international order are increasingly unstable. There is an urgent need to recognize the structural nature of the challenges facing the multilateral mechanisms that have been constructed to try to stabilize the international system. I do not argue that power no longer matters to international relations, nor that powerful states are an irrelevance in an era of globalization. Nothing could be further from the truth. Rather, my point of departure is that we need to rethink how it is that power matters, and how the inevitable inequalities of power in world politics can be harnessed to better provide order in a complex world.

In this book I challenge the idea that the great powers are always vital managers of international society. This at once generous and self-serving idea has become increasingly entrenched in the formal legal principles of international order. The process through which this has occurred (which will be explored in the next two chapters) has served to build into the international system a series of assumptions about how the system works that were always at best questionable and that now are badly out of date. The notion that international politics can (and should) be managed by a club of the powerful sits
very uneasily in the current order. Beyond the obvious tensions between the formal egalitarian principles of the contemporary international system and the iniquities that are required for such a system to work, there is a sense that the underlying mechanics of the international system are simply not manageable by any state or even small group of states. The sheer size of the world’s human population; the level, extent, and character of the economic, political, and cultural links between and among these populations; and the vast array of threats and challenges we face today cast doubts that an institution created in the diplomatic salons in the heart of early nineteenth-century Austria belongs in a globalized world. Indeed, one might reasonably wonder why it was that the founders of the United Nations thought that a principle of aristocratic nineteenth-century diplomacy, born of a world in which the dual systems of sovereignty and imperialism dominated the globe, was going to work in a decolonizing world beset with the destructive power of atomic weaponry. To answer this question, we must consider the evolution of the European international system and how it has been understood to make sense of why the idea of great power management, ostensibly sprung from Viscount Castlereagh’s head, found such fertile ground in the minds of the hard-headed diplomats designing the United Nations during the final years of World War II.

Notes

1. For a good overview of the conference and the background to the foundation of the UN, see Schlesinger, Act of Creation.
2. See, for example, Bourantonis, History and Politics of UN Security Council Reform, and Franda, United Nations in the Twenty-First Century.
3. Waltz, Theory of International Politics.
7. For some examples of this literature, see Michael Brown (ed.), Rise of China; Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower; and Panagariya, India.
8. On this, see Bisley, Rethinking Globalization.
9. von Ranke, “The Great Powers,” 202–203. Interestingly, historian Paul Kennedy modelled his best-selling survey of the rise and fall of the great powers over the past 500 years on Ranke’s 1833 essay. This is evident in the definition it provides for a great power: it is “by definition a state capable of holding its own against any other nation,” Kennedy, Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, 697.
10. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 131.


17. For other examples of this approach to the great powers see, Levy, War in the Modern Great Power System, 16; Suzuki, “Seeking ‘Legitimate’ Great Power Status in Post–Cold War International Society,” 45–63; and Buzan, United States and the Great Powers, 68.

18. Ian Clark, Hierarchy of States, 38.

